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ABSTRACT 
 Western governments have invested considerable resources in counter-violent 
extremism (CVE) programs in an effort to reduce the spread of terrorism both 
domestically and internationally. One approach, formal education, holds potential as a 
long-term strategy for preventing violent extremist ideologies from taking hold in a 
community. While many CVE experts agree that education is a valuable tool for 
preventing extremism, exactly what skills, knowledge, theories, and other aspects of 
education are most effective in countering violent extremism is still a matter of debate. 
This thesis applies socialization theory as an analytical lens to three case studies of 
educational programs in Indonesia and Australia to analyze how these programs instill 
commitment to the desired values and behaviors within students. It finds that 
socialization theory provides a useful framework for analyzing the ability of an 
educational institution to effect widespread social change, such as countering violent 
extremism. This research also indicates that a program’s influence is not necessarily 
limited by its size, but considerable time, resources, and direction are required to achieve 
an organization’s goals through education. Considering these findings, this thesis 
recommends that CVE practitioners incorporate socialization theory into future education 
programs to assist in countering violent extremist ideologies in target populations. 
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Western governments have invested considerable resources in counter-violent 
extremism (CVE) programs in an effort to reduce the spread of terrorism both domestically 
and internationally. The need for effective preventative measures is especially critical 
today as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) continues to recruit around the globe, 
despite the loss of territory in the Middle East. One approach, formal education, holds 
potential as a long-term strategy for preventing violent extremist ideologies from taking 
hold in a community.  
This thesis aims to investigate the potential of formal education as a preventative 
strategy for reducing violent extremism, particularly in Muslim majority countries. 
Specifically, it aims to investigate what aspects of formal education may help prevent 
students from adopting violent extremist ideologies, and the potential challenges and 
pitfalls that may occur when outside actors promote specific types of formal education in 
Muslim-majority countries.  
A. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
Numerous theories attempt to explain the complexities of the radicalization process 
and the social, political, religious, and psychological factors that lead to extremist violence. 
For example, political scientist Guilain Denoeux identifies more than twenty different 
radicalizing factors in three categories: socioeconomic drivers, including social exclusion, 
discrimination, the influence of social networks and group dynamics, relative deprivation, 
poverty, and greed; political drivers, such as corruption, war, repression, the existence of 
radical institutions, and state sponsorship of extremist organizations; and cultural drivers, 
including perceived cultural threats, religious intolerance, and proactive religious agendas 
that support extremist narratives and ways of thinking.1 Denoeux argues that any 
combination of these factors, depending on individual circumstances, can set the conditions 
                                                 
1 Guilain Denoeux, “Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming” 
(Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, October 2009), 11–31. 
2 
for violent extremist narratives to thrive and influence individuals to support violent 
extremist organizations.2 
Psychologist Randy Borum believes several social science theories show promise 
in explaining the radicalization process, including collective radicalization, conversion 
theory, and moral disengagement theory, among others. Collective radicalization posits 
that groups adopt extremist beliefs through a process of competition with state powers, in-
group competition, and isolation, all of which intensify, coalesce, and polarize the opinions 
of their members to ever higher levels of radical belief.3 Conversion theory addresses 
radicalization at the individual level, rather than group level, and focuses on the individual 
process of transforming beliefs and ideologies in response to different motivations, 
including dissatisfaction with the current system, seeking acceptance, elevated status, 
revenge, or addressing personal or political grievances.4 Also at an individual level, moral 
disengagement theory holds that otherwise moral people commit violent acts by 
dehumanizing their victims, absolving themselves of blame, and disregarding the 
consequences of their actions.5 Borum concludes that no single theory can completely 
explain the radicalization process, but using established social science concepts may help 
CVE practitioners move forward in future research and activities.6 
Several scholars note the connection between formal education and the potential 
for reducing extremist views and actions based on one or more of the above drivers. For 
example, education expert Ratna Ghosh claims that young people are particularly 
susceptible to violent extremist ideologies, and as such need to be positively engaged 
before they become radicalized.7 Ghosh argues that formal education can assist in reducing 
                                                 
2 Denoeux, 3–4. 
3 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: Review of Social Science Theories,” 
Journal of Strategic Security, Perspectives on Radicalization and Involvement in Terrorism, 4, no. 4 
(2011): 22. 
4 Borum, 25–27. 
5 Borum, 29–30. 
6 Borum, 31. 
7 Ratna Ghosh et al., “Can Education Counter Violent Religious Extremism?,” Canadian Foreign 
Policy Journal 23, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 119, https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2016.1165713. 
3 
or eliminating vulnerabilities within students that violent extremist organizations attempt 
to exploit, thus undermining the radicalization process before it begins.8 Claire Lorentzen, 
Education Manager at Generation Global, an international CVE education initiative of the 
Tony Blair Faith Foundation in the United Kingdom, asserts that formal education provides 
a proactive approach to equip young people with the knowledge and skills they need to 
reject violent extremism.9 Similarly, political scientist Ömer Taşpınar argues that 
education provides opportunities for growth and prosperity, which undermines the efforts 
of violent extremist organizations, who recruit largely from uneducated, impoverished 
youth with little prospects for the future.10 In 2015, the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) developed a CVE educational program 
with the purpose of promoting relevant, equitable, and inclusive education to address the 
underlying conditions that lead to violent extremism.11 
While many CVE experts agree that education is a valuable tool in preventing 
extremism, exactly what skills, knowledge, theories, and other aspects of education are 
most effective in preventing or countering violent extremism is still a matter of some 
debate.12 For example, the UN Global Education First Initiative held a roundtable debate 
in 2016 between CVE experts with differing views on the prevention of violent extremism 
through education. During the debate, Tunisian Representative Mohamed Khaled Khiari 
discussed increasing diversity and tolerance training within education, while Hahn 
Choonghee of the Republic of Korea stressed the need to provide young people with 
cognitive skills to judge right from wrong. Researcher Naureen Chowdhury Fink stressed 
the need for a gender-based perspective of CVE, arguing that women have largely been 
                                                 
8 Ghosh et al., 121. 
9 Claire Lorentzen, “Education Programs Can Help to Prevent Radicalization in Schools,” Social 
Studies Review 55 (2016): 44–46. 
10 Ömer Taspınar, “Fighting Radicalism, Not ‘Terrorism’: Root Causes of an International Actor 
Redefined,” SAIS Review XXIX, no. 2 (2009): 75–89. 
11 Soo-Hyang Choi and Alexander Leicht, eds., Preventing Violent Extremism Through Education: A 
Guide for Policy-Makers, Education 2030 (Paris, France: United Nations Education, Science, and Cultural 
Organization, 2015). 
12 Agnese Macaluso, “From Countering to Preventing Radicalization Through Education: Limits and 
Opportunities,” The Hague Institute for Global Justice, Hague Institute Working Paper Series, 18 (October 
2016): 17. 
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seen as victims and bystanders of extremist violence instead of active participants. Finally, 
Jorge Sequeira, of the UN Counter-Terrorism Initiative Task Force, argued that more focus 
needs to be placed on how educational content is delivered, who should be involved, and 
how different education policies affect different populations.13 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis investigates the following question: what is the relationship between 
formal education and violent extremism? More specifically, under what conditions do 
formal education prevent or instigate violent extremism? How do variations in aspects of 
formal education—such as curriculum, chosen learning style, subjects, materials, and 
pedagogy—affect violent extremism prevention strategies? And to what extent do cultural 
factors facilitate or inhibit preventative education programs? Finally, how can the United 
States Government best use formal education programs to prevent violent extremism 
abroad? 
The thesis seeks to answer the above questions through a controlled case study 
comparison of educational programs, including the Salafi school system in Indonesia, the 
Muhammadiyah School system, also in Indonesia, and the Beyond Bali Education Program 
in Australia. These case studies were chosen for their socio-political values, educational 
practices, and comparative levels of success in advancing their aims through education. 
They were also chosen based on their size, geographic proximity to one another, and focus 
on Muslim communities.  
The thesis applies socialization theory to help explain how these programs have 
instilled “commitment,” or the faithful realization of the principles of the group in all 
actions of its members and their willingness to be held accountable in doing so, within their 
students. Specifically, it applies a framework based on five socializing activities identified 
by sociologists Jeffrey Hadden and Theodore Long—showing (demonstrating the values 
                                                 
13 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “Can Education Prevent Violent 
Extremism? Roundtable Debate on the Prevention of Violent Extremism through Education,” Global 




of the group), shaping (reinforcing commitment to those social values), recruiting 
(identifying and attracting new members), certifying (validating commitment to group 
values), and placing (incorporating members into the group)—to help identify and analyze 
the specific socializing aspects of the selected educational programs.  
The thesis draws from academic materials used in the above programs, government 
documents, reports from non-governmental organizations, and secondary literature to 
investigate the underlying methodologies of these education programs. Each case study 
includes a brief history and purpose of the educational system, an analysis of the 
methodology and pedagogy of the educational system, and an examination of the specific 
aspects of the educational program—such as curriculum, chosen learning style, subjects, 
materials, content, and pedagogy—that have socializing effects that contribute to the 
education system’s ability to instill commitment to the organization’s values and 
objectives. Finally, the thesis compares the findings from each study and makes 
recommendations for future use in other countries looking to prevent violent extremism 
through education. 
C. PREVIEW OF FINDINGS 
Through the investigation of these cases, the thesis identifies four broad findings 
for developing and evaluating CVE education programs. First, an evaluation tool is needed 
for CVE programs, and socialization theory provides such a tool for analyzing the ability 
of educational institutions to prevent violent extremist ideologies from taking hold within 
a community. Second, socialization takes a considerable amount of time to achieve results, 
yet many CVE programs continue to operate for relatively short durations. Third, money 
is not the only form of influence; agents that control the content and context of a program 
can shape it to accomplish their goals. Finally, an educational program’s ability to exert 
influence over social structures at the national level is not necessarily dependent on the 
number of schools in the system, which means that Western governments do not 
necessarily need to establish massive CVE education programs to achieve broad effects. In 
light of these findings, this thesis recommends that practitioners incorporate socialization 
theory into future CVE education programs and that they consider the considerable time 
6 
and oversight required to fashion these programs into effective socializing agents. These 
points are further elucidated throughout the thesis and in its conclusion. 
D. OUTLINE OF THESIS 
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II begins with a brief historical context of 
Western and Islamic views on the purpose of education and its use as a socializing agent. 
Critically, the chapter illustrates how the origins and history of education both in the West 
and in the Muslim world play important roles in shaping modern-day views on how various 
countries use education to counter violent extremism. Building off of this overview, 
Chapter II then defines socialization theory as the process in which individuals learn the 
social norms, morals, and skills necessary to operate as productive members of society, 
and how education lends itself as a socializing agent. It then proposes a framework based 
on the five-activity socialization process developed by Long and Hadden to help analyze 
each case study. 
Chapter III surveys four major Western approaches to counter-violent extremism 
education: critical thinking skills, exposure to diversity, religious education, and vocational 
training, as well as the current debate surrounding their effectiveness. It concludes with an 
analysis of the approaches using the framework from Chapter II to identify how they 
commit students to specific communal values that contribute to preventing violent 
extremism. The chapter finds that the majority of the CVE approaches display at least two 
strong socializing activities, but none display all five. Each could benefit from further 
examination into how to operate as socializing agents to prevent violent extremism. 
Chapter IV investigates the development and educational activities of the Salafi 
school system in Indonesia and how it has used social processes to spread this ultra-
conservative form of Islam. It begins with a discussion on Salafism in Indonesia and 
various countries’ support of Salafi education there, most notably Saudi Arabia. It then 
outlines the effects Salafi schools have had on Indonesian society, namely the increasing 
Arabization of the country. The chapter then describes the socializing activities of the 
Salafi school network and finds that the schools are able to socialize commitment to a 
7 
closed communal identity that refuses to operate within the secular political system, 
segregates itself from society, and antagonizes traditional establishments. 
Chapter V examines the socializing properties of the Muhammadiyah educational 
institution in Indonesia, founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan. It outlines the organization’s 
history, ideology, development, and relationship with the Indonesian government and 
describes the aspects of the Muhammadiyah school system that help students internalize 
the underlying principles of the organization. The chapter concludes with an analysis of 
the socializing activities of the Muhammadiyah school system and finds that it performs 
all five socializing activities to instill commitment to modernism, nationalism, and 
tolerance within the student population.  
Chapter VI presents a case study of the Beyond Bali Education Program in 
Australia as a representative example of most current Western CVE education initiatives. 
The chapter describes the background and development of the Beyond Bali Education 
Program, its purpose, and its five-module curriculum, then summarizes the preliminary 
results of the program’s execution in one secular school and one Islamic school in 
Australia. Lastly, the chapter analyzes the socializing activities of Beyond Bali and finds 
that while the program performs several socializing activities, it avoids socializing a 
particular set of communal values by instead focusing on critical thinking to inoculate 
against violent extremist ideologies.  
Chapter VII concludes with an overview of the thesis and a case study comparison 
of the Salafi schools, Muhammadiyah schools, and Beyond Bali Education Program. 
Overall, it identifies that the Salafi schools and Muhammadiyah schools display strong 
evidence for all five socializing activities while the Beyond Bali Education Program 
displays both strong and weak aspects of showing, shaping, and placing with limited 
evidence of recruiting and certifying activities. It then articulates findings from the research 
and offers recommendations for constructing and evaluating CVE education programs. 
  
8 
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II. EDUCATION AND SOCIALIZATION 
Education has a long history as a tool of social change, yet its purpose and methods 
have varied over time and between cultures. Today, considerable debate persists over the 
role of education in preventing and countering radicalization and violence extremism. This 
chapter provides a brief historical context of Western and Islamic views on the purpose of 
education and its use as a socializing agent. Building off of this introduction of the purpose 
of education, the chapter then outlines socialization theory and offers a framework based 
on a socialization process developed by sociologists Theodore Long and Jeffrey Hadden 
to identify and analyze five socializing activities within each selected education program 
and their correlation to the larger violent extremism problem in the country. 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The origins and history of education both in the West and in the Muslim world play 
important roles in shaping modern-day views on how various countries use education to 
counter violent extremism. Critically, the origin of education systems was as much about 
teaching individuals to be members of a community or society as it was about imparting 
knowledge. This section provides a brief historical overview of Western and Islamic 
societies’ educational systems with the goal of better understanding how education works 
as a tool of socialization. 
1. Western Education 
Perhaps the earliest examples of formal educational systems in the West come from 
the ancient Greek city-states. Historians Harry G. Good and William Boyd both point out 
that although Athens and Sparta had differing educational methods—Sparta’s being far 
more militaristic—they shared the similar purpose of creating loyal soldiers and citizens 
who followed the same moral code.14 According to Good, ancient Greek schools did not 
concern themselves with cultivating individual freedom, nor were they concerned with 
                                                 
14 Harry G. Good, A History of Western Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), 19; 
William Boyd, The History of Western Education, ed. Edmund J. King, 8th ed. (New York: Barnes & 
Noble, 1966), 10–17. 
10 
imparting knowledge for the personal benefit of the individual.15 Education was a branch 
of politics, aimed at creating citizens devoted to the state and able to perform their part to 
ensure the state’s continued success.16 Boyd argues that attitudes regarding the purpose of 
education began to shift towards imparting knowledge after Socrates and Plato constructed 
theories of education that included new rational methods and carefully selected content to 
provide the desired examples for children in service of the state.17  
Historians Carroll Atkinson and Eugene Maleska describe how this system lost its 
socializing purpose following the Roman conquest of Greece in 146 B.C., and began to 
focus more on abstract learning than moral development, replicating selected information 
with little emphasis placed on generating new knowledge.18 According to Atkinson and 
Maleska, the school system also standardized, becoming more specialized and technical.19 
By the fifth century A.D., this new system encompassed theological studies, chivalric 
education, trade skills and vocational training, as well as the creation of early universities.20 
Because education was not seen as a social obligation, these institutions were strictly 
reserved for the wealthy and religious elite while the majority of the population received 
no formal education.21 Boyd comes to the same conclusions regarding early education, and 
also notes that distinctions between religious and secular education did not exist at that 
time because the concept of religion was indistinguishable from the state.22 According to 
both Boyd and Good, this trend continued in Europe throughout the Medieval Ages and 
into the Renaissance.23 
                                                 
15 Good, 36. 
16 Good, 36. 
17 Boyd, 26–42. 
18 Carroll Atkinson and Eugene T. Maleska, The Story of Education (Philadelphia and New York: 
Chilton Company, 1962), 28–31. 
19 Atkinson and Maleska, 32. 
20 Atkinson and Maleska, 34, 37–41. 
21 Atkinson and Maleska, 40–41. 
22 Boyd, 99–101. 
23 Boyd, 125–27, 159; Good, 135–36. 
11 
Good attributes the next major shift in western education to the age of 
Enlightenment and the rise of nationalism from the seventeenth through nineteenth 
centuries.24 By the 1760s, philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau pushed for 
compulsory public education to produce patriots for the burgeoning European nations, 
particularly in France.25 Good credits Rousseau for creating the foundation for much of 
modern Western educational philosophy.26 He notes in particular that because Rousseau 
believed that the existing culture of learning had degraded society’s sense of morality and 
led men to neglect their duty as citizens, education, therefore, should focus on the moral, 
social, and patriotic growth of the child in preparation for public service in adulthood.27 
Rousseau further argued that one cannot simply tell citizens to be patriots, that “education 
must give the souls of the people a national form and must so shape their opinions 
and tastes that they become patriots as much by inclination and passion as by 
necessity…compel them, by education to love their country, its land and life and 
liberties.”28 Rousseau believed that the best way to achieve this ideal was to create an 
unconstrained, “natural” environment that stimulated growth and discovery of these 
values.29  
The rise of nationalism and the inception of mass conscription, the levee en mass, 
created another important demand for public education. Historian Ambrogio Caiani notes 
that, in 1790, the French government instituted the levee to muster a military force large 
enough to oppose other European armies.30 Building and maintaining a compulsory force 
of that size required the support and participation of the people.31 To gain this support and 
                                                 
24 Good, 135. 
25 Good, 197–209. 
26 Good, 207. 
27 Good, 207–9. 
28 Good, 209. 
29 Good, 222. 
30 Ambrogio A. Caiani, “Levée En Masse” (European History Online (EGO), published by the Institute 
of European History (IEG), Mainz, December 3, 2010), 1–3, http://www.ieg-ego.eu/caiania-2010-en URN: 
urn:nbn:de:0159-20100921155. 
31 Caiani, 2–4. 
12 
to increase the efficacy of the conscription program, the French government used the 
education system to instill feelings of patriotic duty and provide preparatory training for 
military service.32 In effect, Europe’s nationalist-era education reflected the educational 
aims of the ancient Greeks. 
According to sociologist Milan Zafirovski, it took Western educators nearly a 
century to refine the system’s nationalistic purpose and adopt a philosophy that followed 
the more ideological principles of the Enlightenment, including realism, liberty, 
secularism, and the scientific method.33 Beginning in the late eighteenth century, Western 
education began to focus on personal enrichment in addition to social and economic 
productivity.34 Good concurs, noting that much of Western society throughout the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries established national liberal education systems 
with the aim to create a “wise, free, and noble” people, promoting the ideals of the French 
Revolution and the spread of modern democracy.35 It was during this period that Europe, 
and to some extent the new United States, embraced a model of free and nearly universal 
secular education focused on critical thought and free debate.36 
While nationalist educators sought to cultivate a “civilized” society in Europe, 
historian James A. Mangan argues that European colonial powers used education for very 
different purposes in the territories they controlled overseas.37 Mangan asserts that the 
British prevented conflict with colonized populations by using education, largely provided 
by Christian missionaries, to inculcate native children with “appropriate attitudes of 
dominance and deference” that legitimized British supremacy over the “inferior” native 
people.38 Education expert Tatang Suratno offers an example of the Dutch education policy 
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in Indonesia, which educated only the elite native families to create an obedient clerical 
class that administrated over the rest of the indigenous population in support of the Dutch 
monarchy.39 As a result, the remainder of the population, particularly the indigenous 
Muslim community, were left to build native school systems separate from the colonial 
enterprise.40 According to linguistics professor Peter Lowenberg, these systems struggled 
to provide basic education to the large indigenous population given their limited resources 
and lack of support from the Dutch colonial government.41 By 1900, a total of 1,500 
schools existed in the Dutch East Indies, an average of only one school per 24,000 
inhabitants.42 When Indonesia gained its independence in 1945, the literacy rate among 
Malayo-Muslims had reached only five percent.43 However, according to Lowenberg, 
these native schools provided the groundwork for a future Indonesian national education 
system and preserved a unified indigenous linguistic and cultural identity that flourished 
in the years following independence.44 
The twentieth century has witnessed the development of numerous theories on the 
ideal purpose and methods of formal education. For example, philosopher John Dewey’s 
“child-centered” educational theory focuses on providing experiential learning that allows 
children to interact with their environment through a self-guided learning process.45 Rather 
than educating merely to meet the needs of the state, Dewey’s theory emphasized educating 
to benefit the emotional, intellectual, and physical growth of the child.46 Economists 
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis credit Dewey’s theory as the cornerstone of the modern 
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progressive education movement in Europe and the United States.47 Economists Laura 
Holden and Jeff Biddle attribute another major movement to fellow economist Theodore 
Schultz, who popularized the “human capital” theory in 1960. The theory holds that a 
government can spur economic growth by devoting resources to public development 
projects, including education.48 Human capital theory frames education as an investment 
that improves the overall economic value of individuals, which in turn increases the 
productivity of the state.49 According to Holden and Biddle, Schultz’s theory led to the 
“institutionalist” view of schooling responsible for much of the standardization and 
measurement of educational processes found in modern schools.50 
Over the last twenty years, some scholars have begun to advocate for less state-
centric constructs that promote global citizenship over national identities. For instance, 
Fred Van Leeuwen, educator and General Secretary of Education International, a global 
teacher’s union federation, argues against academic testing and the economic model, 
favoring a reimagining of Enlightenment principles by teaching critical thinking skills and 
free debate in schools to generate understanding and tolerance among students in 
preparation for life in an increasingly globalized society.51 These and numerous other 
theories continue to vie for influence over public schools in many Western nations today. 
The fact that this tension between theories endures is, perhaps, telling of how the deeply-
rooted ideals of critical thought and open debate continue to shape the Western conception 
of formal education. 
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2. Islamic Education 
Just as Western education developed from a plurality of ideas and practices, Islamic 
education has grown from a range of sources and philosophies, carried out by various actors 
for varying purposes over time. Anthropologists Robert Hefner and Muhammad Zaman 
describe the development of formal Islamic education, which began in Persia the early 
1000s and spread throughout the Middle East and beyond.52 They assert that, for much of 
its history, the madrasa—literally meaning “school” in Arabic53—provided instruction in 
both religious and non-religious topics, including classical Greek education, and pioneered 
developments in math, astronomy, medicine, philosophy, architecture, and more; these 
schools acted as the center of Muslim society.54 Somewhat ironically, this vast body of 
knowledge, including classical literature and thought, eventually made its way back into 
Western academia through Spain and helped spark the European Renaissance.55 Good goes 
so far as to claim that were it not for the efforts of these early Islamic scholars, much of the 
ancient literature neglected during the medieval era would have been lost forever.56 
Hefner argues that Islamic education has always been dependent on political and 
social support, and so the form and function of religious education has transformed to 
reflect the society it served.57 For example, a strong and independent society in northern 
Iraq during the eleventh century instituted and managed the madrasa system separate from 
the ruling establishment as a means to exert authority in defiance of the state.58 Alternately, 
in Mamluk Egypt and Syria, the Turkic elite sponsored madrasas to build legitimacy in the 
eyes of the largely Arab population over which they presided, and to appease powerful 
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Arab families who could pose a threat to the dynasty.59 Historian Jonathan Berkey states 
that education became a tool for social reform in the Muslim world as early as the 
eighteenth century.60 According to Berkey, the Ottoman Empire instituted widespread 
educational reforms, made educators effective employees of the state for the first time, and 
built a vast network of schools, all to resist European colonial encroachment and shape the 
larger Ottoman society for future advancement.61  
By the late nineteenth century, Berkey argues, continued exposure to Western 
colonial education institutions generated the drive to provide an alternative Islamic 
education that has, over time, become increasingly narrow, rigid, and scripturalist in certain 
parts of the world.62 According to Berkey, this trend is due as much to various groups 
attempting to define and propagate a timeless, unitary form of Islamic practice as it is a 
reaction to Western secularism.63 Berkey further states that early Islam functioned through 
oral transmission of knowledge derived from a consensus among respected religious 
authorities, but some believed that such a fluid system led to heterodoxy within the faith.64 
For example, the British Colonial government and Indian Ulama attempted to regulate 
British-Muslim relations by constructing an “Anglo-Muhammadan Law” to standardize 
Muslim practices and created Islamic equivalents to British law.65 This move to standardize 
Islamic practice affected reform of Indian madrasas as well, spurring debate over whether 
it would be more useful for madrasas to prepare students to participate in modern social 
and economic life or protect “Islam” by focusing strictly on religious topics—which would 
require defining a unitary and timeless definition of Islam to protect and propagate.66 
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Indonesia provides a more recent example of the varying purposes within Islamic 
education, particularly in response to Western colonialism. Hefner and Zaman attribute the 
spread of Islamic education in Indonesia to small-scale, local schools—called pesantren, 
pondok, surau, or dayah schools, depending on the region in which they are located—that 
filled the vacuum created by Dutch inattention to most of the population and lack of a 
unified Islamic structure in the country.67 These schools initially focused on traditional 
Qur’anic subjects, but by the early 1900s incorporated general education courses to 
compete with Dutch colonial schools and the newly established Islamic madrasas in the 
country that offered both religious and general education for the indigenous population.68 
These independent schools blended local tradition with Islamic teaching as well as 
elements of Western education to create a unique, populist, and trans-ethnic “Malayo-
Muslim” identity throughout the country.69 
South Asian Islamic education, on the other hand, followed a different path. In 
1867, during British colonial rule in India, a small Islamic school stood up in the village of 
Deoband and quickly spread throughout the continent.70 According to Hefner, the loose 
confederation of schools known as the Deobandi system adopted Western administrative 
practices to compete with the state-run schools in the area but rejected Western content in 
the school curriculum.71 They instead focused on creating a unified Indian Muslim 
community that advocated for scriptural literacy and the primacy of the Hanafi school of 
Islamic law over local traditions.72 This school system further passed on the dress, social 
etiquette, and learning traditionally reserved for the Muslim upper class to all those who 
followed the Deobandi movement.73 Initially, the Deobandi schools relied on local funding 
from the general public but, over time—and particularly after the partition of Pakistan and 
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India—Pakistani madrasas began to receive significant funding from Saudi Arabia and 
other Arab Gulf states, and with that funding came the influence of Salafism in Pakistan, 
an understanding of Islam that centers around strict adherence to tawhid, or the oneness of 
God, and the removal of human subjectivity, reason, and logic in following Qur’anic 
guidance.74 According to political scientist Quintan Wiktorowicz, Salafism holds that there 
is only one legitimate religious understanding of God’s commands, and therefore, with no 
room for interpretation, Islamic pluralism cannot exist.75 Wiktorowicz further contends 
that this uncompromising interpretation can exacerbate conflicts between those who hold 
different beliefs—even between different factions within Salafism—and limits prospects 
for compromise and understanding.76 
Today, Saudi-influenced Salafism dominates the current discourse on modern 
Islamic education. In 2013, sociologist William Racimora published a study for the 
Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Union outlining the impact of 
Salafi financial support on educational and social institutions in Bosnia, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, and Tunisia.77 In the report, Racimora argues that Salafis aim to impose their 
strict and literalist understanding of Sunni Islam throughout the globe.78 The methods used 
to establish it, however, are highly adaptive to varying political contexts and exploit 
modern technologies, educational institutions, and both private and public charities in 
targeted societies.79 Racimora credits the success of the movement, in particular, to the 
funding provided by financial elites in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.80 Particularly 
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since the 1970s, their support has spread the Salafi ideology beyond the Arabian Peninsula 
to challenge Western, local, and opposing Islamic educational practices worldwide.81  
Just as in Western society, trends in Islamic education have shifted over time, and 
educational philosophies continue to differ among the various modern Islamic institutions 
teaching throughout the world today. Islamic education has taken on many forms since the 
eleventh century, from pioneering developments in mathematics, medicine, architecture, 
and philosophy to focusing strictly on theological studies, from encompassing a wide range 
of beliefs to competing to impose a single, unitary form of Islam. These differences exist 
in part as a reaction to the tension created by intersecting local traditions, Islamic education, 
and Western secular influence. This competition between local practices, Islamic 
ideologies, and secular education will likely continue well into the future. 
B. SOCIALIZATION THEORY 
Several scholars argue that socialization theory may help elucidate the connection 
between formal education and countering extremism. Although specific definitions of 
socialization vary by discipline, sociologist John A. Clausen provides a general description 
of socialization as “the process of inducing an individual to willingly conform to the 
standards of acceptable behavior expected by the group to which he or she belongs.”82 In 
socialization theory, Clausen argues, individuals learn the social norms, morals, and skills 
necessary to operate as productive members of society from various socializing agents, 
including parents and authority figures, social groups, religious institutions, and schools.83 
Sociologist Steven Barkan describes socialization as the “process by which people learn 
their culture.”84 Without socialization, argues Barkan, people could not develop a culture, 
nor cultivate a coherent society.85  Sociologists Jeffrey Hadden and Theodore Long agree 
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with Barkan regarding the significance of socialization theory and argue that the concept 
of socialization is so ingrained within the social sciences that it serves as the cornerstone 
of social theory.86  
Within the broader framework of socialization theory, the concept of 
“commitment” is particularly important. Hadden and Long define commitment as “the 
faithful realization of the principles of the group in all actions of its members and their 
willingness to be held accountable in doing so” and consider it the most important attribute 
that socializing agents produce within acceptable new members of a group.87 This 
commitment produces confidence within the group that the new member is able and, more 
importantly, willing to perform as expected, especially in the absence of constant 
supervision.88 Therefore, commitment represents “the members’ faithfulness to group 
ideals and intention to use them as a guide in discretionary situations.”89 The authors argue 
that without commitment, any knowledge or skills imparted to the member are wasted, or 
worse, may be used the sabotage the group.90 
1. Education as a Socializing Agent 
Formal education is a key socialization tool that develops a sense of commitment 
among young members to the ideals of their society. According to education expert Henry 
Giroux, education systems tend to reflect the social and ideological values of society, 
exemplify the values and duties of the ideal citizen in that society, and transmit those values 
to future generations.91 For example, sociologist Reinhard Bendix describes nineteenth-
century Western socialization efforts using education to increase worker productivity and 
compliance in an industrializing market. Education at that time was designed to instill the 
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values of frugality and hard work, ultimately creating a perception of “economic success 
as a symbol of virtue and failure a sign of moral turpitude.”92 Barkan also gives a poignant 
example of socialization in American education through a “hidden curriculum”—or the 
social lessons and communal values instructed in the school beyond the abstract knowledge 
included in the formal curriculum: 
Children learn primarily positive things about the country’s past and 
present; they learn the importance of being neat, patient, and obedient; and 
they learn to compete for good grades and other rewards. In this manner, 
they learn to love America and not to recognize its faults, and they learn 
traits that prepare them for jobs and careers that will bolster the capitalist 
economy. Children are also socialized to believe that failure, such as earning 
poor grades, stems from not studying hard enough and, more generally, 
from not trying hard enough.93 
Barkan concludes that it is this hidden curriculum, as much or more than any other aspect 
of education, that engenders within students the cultural values of their society in which 
they live.94 
Historian Larry Holmes offers an additional example in how the revolutionary 
Soviet government used education as a socializing influence to secure its position and 
support of the citizens.95 Following the Communist Revolution in Russia in 1917, the 
Soviet education wing, the Commissariat of Enlightenment, quickly set about reshaping 
the school system to reflect communist ideals and developed pedagogies that furthered the 
objectives of the revolution.96 The Commissariat combined all Soviet schools into a single 
system that provided an identical, free, and universal education for every Soviet citizen.97 
The program implemented a curriculum designed to develop basic technical skills for 
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future work, and also had its own “hidden curriculum” that sought to eradicate the concepts 
of social classes, the division of labor, and nationalism from the population.98 
Holmes discovered that the Commissariat could not simply dictate radical change 
and achieve meaningful results despite having complete authority over the national 
education system.99 The plan faced continual resistance from local teachers who refused to 
implement the reforms in classrooms across the country.100 Making the Soviet educational 
vision a reality required getting local teachers to commit to the purpose, methods, and 
desired outcomes of the new system, which took nearly thirty years of persuasion and a 
series of compromises to accomplish.101 Holmes concludes that, although the program 
eventually found some success in instilling communist ideals and support for the Soviet 
system amongst the population, the Soviet educational reforms demonstrated the need to 
apply vast resources, time, and direction to achieve widespread social change through 
education.102 
2. Analytical Framework 
Considering the power of socialization to form identities and commit members of 
the group to specific values, the potential for socialization to contribute to the success of 
CVE educational programs warrants further examination. To that end, this thesis applies a 
framework based on a socialization model developed by Long and Hadden to identify the 
socializing activities of the selected educational programs and their effect on violent 
extremism. Long and Hadden focus on five socializing activities in particular that assist in 
engendering commitment: showing, shaping, recruiting, certifying, and placing.103 
Showing is, in essence, the introduction of the social order to the new member. This 
activity incorporates describing the group’s culture and organization, demonstrating the 
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requirements for maintaining membership in the group, and defining how the group holds 
new members accountable for meeting these requirements.104 This activity is necessarily 
abstract, requiring socializing agents to highlight selected aspects of the group at the cost 
of others, as the new members have neither the time nor ability to comprehend the full 
complexity of the system.105 In an educational setting, this activity may manifest itself in 
the presentation of the values system of the school culture itself or those of the community 
of which the students are a part or will join upon graduation. 
Shaping involves applying punishments and rewards for behavior to reinforce the 
values of the group.106 These sanctions may be routine, such as through evaluations, or 
applied in an ad hoc manner to address specific situations as they arise. In a setting where 
individual membership to the group is automatic, such as child socialization in schools or 
communities, such actions should be frequent and explicit to account for the lack of the 
option to remove the member from the group.107 Shaping is critical to influencing students 
to commit to desired values and behaviors because it compels them to adhere to the 
standards of the group, at least while under supervision. While shaping does not necessarily 
guarantee compliance, it does demonstrate the relative value of certain aspects of the group 
and the desired behaviors of members.108  
Recruiting is simply the selection process for identifying and attracting potential 
new members.109 Hadden and Long identify child socialization as a partial exception to 
this because children are automatically selected to be members of their family and society, 
although they can be recruited to fill particular roles in those groups.110 For the purposes 
of CVE education, analysis of this activity will generally focus on if and how the school 
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assists with recruiting students into other groups and how those groups relate to any violent 
extremism in the community. 
Certifying serves as a quality control measure to track a new member’s progress 
and can be either formal or informal.111 This activity includes making a judgment on the 
fitness of a potential member to join the group and the extent of their commitment to the 
values of the group, which is usually then ritually conferred to create “social confidence” 
within the new member and among others in accepting the new member.112 Analysis of 
this activity within CVE education will focus on how the school creates social confidence 
within students as members of a follow-on group, more so than studying the formal 
evaluations of a student’s understanding of curriculum content. 
Placing requires situating the new member into positions—again either formal or 
informal—within the group.113 As a complement to recruiting, placing situates a new 
member within the group’s social order, and defines the limits and opportunities for him 
or her as an acceptable member of that group.114 As with recruiting and certifying, this 
thesis will analyze placing in the context of how an educational program incorporates 
students into its social structure and then prepares and assists students in taking social 
positions after graduation. 
Table 1 provides a reference for the five activities of the analytical framework to 
be used throughout the thesis. This framework is deliberately broad, which makes it 
particularly useful when attempting to operationalize socialization; it can incorporate any 
number or type of socializing agents, including schools, as long as they carry out one or 
more of the five activities, and can explain nearly any effort, including, for instance, how 
children are raised to become productive members of a community, or how violent 
extremist organizations integrate new members into patterns of terrorism. 
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Table 1.   Analytical Framework 
Socializing Activity Description 
Showing 
Describing and demonstrating the group’s culture and 
organization, the requirements for maintaining membership in 
the group, and how the group holds members accountable. 
Shaping 
Applying punishments and rewards for behavior to reinforce 
the values of the group. Builds commitment by habituating 
adherence to the standards of the group. 
Recruiting 
Identifying and attracting students to follow-on groups and 
how those groups relate to any violent extremism in the 
community. 
Certifying 
Conducting quality control to track a new member’s progress 
in committing to certain values and creating “social 
confidence” within students as members of a group. 
Placing 
Incorporating students into the group’s social structure and 
preparing and assisting students in taking social positions 
after graduation. 
 
Identifying how an educational program conducts each of these activities will help 
determine the socializing outcome produced through the program. For instance, if the 
stated purpose of a program is merely to provide technical training, one can expect to see 
little focus on socializing a commitment to a set of values or ideals. This does not mean, 
however, that the program does not have a socializing effect on the students or that the 
program has no effect—either positive or negative—on the larger community’s ability to 
combat violent extremism. 
Addressing the above activities in each case study will help draw conclusions about 
how the educational program works as a socializing agent, how it positively or negatively 
affects violent extremism in the country, and what generalizable lessons learned can be 
taken from it for future CVE education efforts. The next chapter surveys current CVE 
education theories and employs the above framework to each of the four main Western 
CVE educational approaches. 
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III. COUNTER-VIOLENT EXTREMISM EDUCATION 
The complexity of the radicalization process and the difficulty in developing 
suitable programs to counter it has generated disagreement among experts over how best 
to prevent violent extremism through education. While many CVE experts agree that 
education is a valuable tool in preventing extremism, exactly what skills, knowledge, 
theories, and other aspects of education are most effective in countering violent extremism 
is still a matter of some debate.115 This debate is significant because it has resulted in the 
development of a variety of programs based on the many different—and sometimes 
conflicting—positions held by CVE education experts today. With a lack of consensus 
regarding optimal strategies for preventing extremism through education and the overall 
lack of empirical research and analysis of current CVE program effectiveness, additional 
examination of current CVE education theory and practice is needed to fully understand 
and address this problem.116 
This chapter surveys four major Western approaches to counter-violent extremism 
education: critical thinking skills, exposure to diversity, religious education, and vocational 
training, as well as the current debate surrounding their effectiveness. It concludes with an 
analysis of the approaches using the framework from Chapter II, which focuses on the five 
socializing activities of showing, shaping, recruiting, certifying, and placing to identify 
how they commit students to specific communal values that contribute to preventing 
violent extremism. 
The chapter finds that the majority of the CVE approaches feature strong showing 
activities as part of their educational programs, but that most lack evidence of shaping, 
recruiting, certifying, or placing activities. Finally, while all four programs display at least 
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two strong socializing activities, none display all five, and they could benefit from further 
examination into how to better operate as socializing agents to prevent violent extremism. 
A. CVE EDUCATION APPROACHES 
Scholars and practitioners from numerous countries have developed educational 
programs aimed at interrupting the radicalization process. Most of these CVE educational 
efforts can be categorized into four broad approaches: teaching vocational skills, 
developing critical thinking skills, increasing exposure to diversity, and reforming religious 
education. Each approach addresses specific factors that potentially lead to radicalization 
in an effort to reduce future incidences of violence or support for extremist organizations. 
In practice, CVE education programs can combine two or more approaches to address 
multiple factors influencing the target community and tailor outcomes to each community’s 
unique circumstances. 
1. Vocational Training 
One CVE education approach focuses on teaching practical skills that will allow 
individuals to pursue gainful employment. This approach centers on the belief that poverty 
and the lack of economic prospects create perceptions of injustice and marginalization that 
drive extremism, and that providing skills training, resources, and economic opportunities 
for young people will preclude them from turning to violent extremist organizations.117 
Economist and political scientist Ömer Taşpınar argues that education provides 
opportunities for growth and prosperity, which undermine the efforts of violent extremist 
organizations who recruit largely from uneducated, impoverished youth with little 
prospects for the future.118 He contends that CVE programs must prioritize increasing the 
quality of life in developing nations, particularly in the Muslim world, to combat feelings 
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of discrimination or lack of opportunity among youth as they enter the workforce.119 By 
providing relevant skills and opportunities for employment commensurate with the 
expectations of young Muslims in an increasingly globalized society, Taspinar believes 
CVE programs can reduce the appeal of extremism as a means to combat inequality.120 To 
achieve this goal, he recommends that Western nations implement programs that increase 
literacy rates, labor productivity, and technical training while incentivizing institutional 
reforms that promote human development and better governance within developing 
nations.121 
Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) recognizes 
growing perceptions of inequality and injustice as a major contributor to violent extremism 
and recommends creating effective economic alternatives for at-risk groups to combat this 
radicalizing influence.122 In addition to building state capacity and inclusiveness, UNDP 
programs focus on improving education levels and marketable skills for marginalized 
populations and provide them with better access to jobs.123 UNDP stresses, however, that 
vocational training projects must create meaningful opportunities for employment to avoid 
creating unrealistic expectations that only increase feelings of inequality and 
discrimination.124 
Samantha de Silva, Senior Social Protection Specialist at the World Bank Group, 
also argues that lack of employment opportunities and the resulting hopelessness for a 
better future create the conditions that allow extremist ideologies to spread.125 De Silva 
advocates for the vocational skills development (VSD) approach, which focuses on “basic 
education, technical and practical skills training and also soft and life skills” to empower 
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youth and give them a sense of purpose, resulting in both employability and social 
inclusiveness.126 Likewise, she supports instituting targeted skills programs that take into 
account the local labor market and social dynamics of the community to ensure the program 
develops realistic expectations among the trainees and avoids the perceptions of favoritism 
between groups.127 
One example of such a program is the Tujengane Tuinuane Youth Skills for 
Business & CVE program in Kenya. This program is administered by the Ummah Initiative 
Group (UIG), a Kenyan non-profit community development organization, and is sponsored 
by the USAID Kenya Youth Employment and Skills Program. Established in 2010, it trains 
local youth in competitive job skills to increase their access to economic opportunities and 
strengthen their resilience to violent extremism.128 The three-month training program 
focuses on teaching business skills, basic computer skills, graphic design, photography, 
and videography so that students can find employment or start their own business as well 
as produce digital CVE counter-narrative products for the UIG.129 The UIG also connects 
students with local businesses to provide on the job training and assists with navigating the 
Kenyan legal system to register for national identification cards and apply for business 
licenses.130 Nimosi Hassan, program committee member and Ward Administrator for 
Bongwe Gombato Ward, Kwale County, believes this program will help empower local 
youth to compete in the local, national, and international markets to mitigate the negative 
effects of recent incidences of violent extremism and prevent future occurrences in her 
community.131 
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2. Critical Thinking Skills 
Other CVE programs aim to develop critical thinking skills, also known as 
autonomy education.132 These programs enable students to critically analyze and then 
reject arguments that attempt to justify violent extremism.133 Overall, this approach intends 
for students to reject radical ideologies and adopt a more moderate and inclusive 
worldview. For example, Agnese Macaluso, a researcher at the Hague Institute for Global 
Justice, recommends that educational programs prioritize the cognitive skills of judgment 
and discernment over the inculcation of any specific values or singular identity.134 She 
encourages critical thinking through continually challenging and questioning ideas, and to 
“think beyond taboos and common assumptions.”135 Macaluso believes that critical 
thinking and idea-sharing are necessary for development. She also asserts that critical 
thinking skills compel students to form a nuanced and complex view of the world that 
prevents the kind of black-and-white thinking prevalent among violent extremists.136 
Education expert Lynn Davies argues that CVE educational programs should 
empower students with an awareness of conflicting viewpoints and give them the ability to 
compare their values to those espoused by extremist organizations.137 According to Davies, 
education can address extremism in schools by encouraging critical analysis and political 
activism among students, using humor and satire to delegitimize violent extremist 
arguments and challenge their views by supporting secular human rights.138 Davies also 
asserts that programs should develop skills to raise awareness of how information is 
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presented and to analyze different narratives critically, especially in the media, to separate 
truth from myth and make informed decisions.139  
Education experts Farid Panjwani, Lynn Revell, Reza Gholami, and Mike Diboll 
advocate for a modern liberal education that focuses on developing critical thinking skills 
to “foster students’ powers of questioning, criticality and imagining egalitarian futures as 
the way forward in contesting all forms of extremism…”140 Panjwani et al. contend that 
there is a difference between radical ideas and radical actions, including violence; the latter 
is a criminal act, but the former is a staple of liberal society that empowers citizens to 
critically analyze and address social issues for the betterment of society.141 Therefore, 
according to Panjwani, schools should foster an open environment of critical discussion 
and critique that allows students to constructively challenge both social norms and beliefs 
that are fixed, intolerant, and closed to scrutiny, such as those espoused by violent extremist 
organizations.142 
One program that promotes critical thinking to counter violent extremism is the 
Creative Curriculum Program (CCP) in Nigeria, a primary school CVE education package 
that empowers students to reject violent extremism.143 Creative Associates International, a 
non-governmental organization focusing on development services in conflict 
environments, with support from USAID, manages the CCP as part of a broader 
educational effort including the Northern Education Initiative Plus and Education Crisis 
Response programs.144 The program encourages students to practice creative problem 
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solving and critical thinking to increase self-confidence, tolerance, and empathy.145 The 
program then provides opportunities for students to apply these skills to challenge divisive 
narratives in their communities.146 The CCP expects that students thus armed with critical 
thinking and creative problem-solving skills will to be able to identify and reject extremist 
narratives and ideologies that promote violence.147 
3. Exposure to Diversity 
Another approach considers exposure to diversity as the fundamental preventative 
measure to violent extremism. Ratna Ghosh, Professor of Education at McGill University, 
argues that providing a positive learning environment that promotes respectful dialogue 
and higher tolerance for competing perspectives will increase understanding and 
appreciation for the varied cultural, religious, and social practices of the wider world. This 
approach, will, in turn, reduce the likelihood that students will adopt violent extremist 
ideologies.148  
UNESCO recommends a similar preventive approach in its guide for CVE 
education policymakers. It advocates increasing resilience to unsophisticated arguments 
that advocate for the use of violence to solve problems by improving students’ ability to 
see problems from multiple perspectives and seek confirmation before making impulsive 
decisions.149 Subsequently, UNESCO expects this approach will propagate an identity of 
global citizenship, which undermines extremist rhetoric that focuses on anti-Western 
messaging, xenophobia, negative stereotypes, and exclusionary identity-forming.150  
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Education expert Alan Smith of Ulster University similarly advocates for 
increasing exposure to diversity in schools in conflict zones to reduce violence and the 
propagation of extremist ideologies. Smith states that many countries embroiled in conflict 
feature schooling which separates students based on ethnicity, language, or religion, which 
foments distrust between groups and reinforces divisions.151 He asserts that education 
contributes to peacebuilding when it combines different groups of children from conflicted 
areas to learn together.152 Furthermore, school programs that support sensitivity to diversity 
and inclusion, especially of minority groups, can help reduce negative stereotypes that 
provoke inter-group conflict.153 Smith also argues that schools should increase exposure to 
diversity and inclusion by hiring both male and female teachers from different backgrounds 
to set a positive example for students.154 
One example of this method is through connecting learners—especially through 
technological means—to students of other nations and cultures. These virtual connections 
allow targeted populations to participate in exchange programs, and by involving both local 
and international cultural institutions.155 One such program, Generation Global, an 
international digital education package, provides training through videoconferences that 
connect students from around the world to learn about the global community and to provide 
opportunities to improve knowledge of different cultures, which in turn increases the 
students’ ability to understand diversity.156 Claire Lorentzen, U.S. Education Manager for 
Generation Global, further argues that media and information literacy are critical for this 
approach to succeed because modern communications technologies provide the conduit 
that exposes students to diverse worldviews.157 
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4. Religious Education 
Another approach focuses specifically on religious education as the driving factor 
behind radicalization and counter-radicalization efforts. David Resnick, Senior Lecturer at 
the Bar-Ilan University School of Education, argues that developing and propagating 
moderate, inclusive religious interpretations—primarily regarding Islamic teachings—
undermines violent extremist ideologies that base their arguments on radical religious 
interpretations.158 Resnick rejects the argument that autonomy education is the best CVE 
program for combatting extremism on the grounds that it becomes problematic for 
educators to force autonomy on cultures that place authority above autonomy. Furthermore, 
he argues that critical thinking rarely works well in practice because it focuses on 
deliberation rather than the content of the outcome.159 Instead, Resnick advocates for 
reworking religious education to identify existing traditions that promote tolerance and to 
foster a form of autonomy in service of the community, rather than pure individual 
autonomy.160  
Research conducted by Indonesian scholar of political Islam Noorhaidi Hasan 
appears to support Resnick’s assertion. Hasan contends that Salafi madrasas, which 
propagate a literalist and often intolerant form of Islam in Indonesia, have been widely 
rejected by the population due to their prior exposure to more moderate religious schools 
in that country, such as the Muhammadiyah school system.161 Muhammadiyah, established 
by Ahmad Dahlan in 1912 to provide indigenous Muslim children with meaningful 
education during Dutch colonial rule, combines Islamic teaching with secular education to 
develop an Islamic civil society that also supports the cultural and religious diversity of the 
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Indonesian people.162 Sudibyo Markus, Executive Board Member for Muhammadiyah, 
states that Muhammadiyah currently operates more than 15,000 schools in Indonesia and 
boasts nearly 30 million members and supporters, including many prominent government 
and civil society leaders, which, he argues, places Muhammadiyah at the forefront of the 
moderate movement in the Islamic world.163 
A CVE-specific example of religious education is the “Enhancing the Role of 
Religious Education in Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia” program, also known 
as the “Convey” program. This collaborative effort between the Government of Japan, 
UNDP, and the Universitas Islam Negeri (State Islamic University) Syarif Hidayatullah 
Jakarta aims to promote tolerance, inclusivity, and nonviolence in Islamic secondary 
schools throughout Indonesia.164 This program characterizes its activities as “Muslim 
Ngefriend” (the word ngefriend is Indonesian teen slang that roughly translates to “building 
understanding [of Islam] through familiarity, closeness, and fun”).165 Muslim Ngefriend 
uses digital media, teen literature, games, and other youth pop-culture materials to connect 
with and engage Muslim youth on topics related to Islamic teachings of tolerance and 
nonviolence.166 The program challenges students to be proud of both their faith and 
nationality, while continually seeking out opportunities for greater understanding and 
adaptability in diverse socio-cultural environments.167 
It is worth noting that some scholars have argued that this approach to CVE is 
unnecessary. Historian William Dalrymple, for instance, argues that, despite frequent 
claims to the contrary, evidence shows that most religious schools, particularly Islamic 
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madrasas, do not produce violent extremists.168 He points out that most of the men 
responsible for the September 2001 attacks were graduates of Western universities, not 
traditional Islamic madrasas.169 Dalrymple acknowledges that many, but certainly not all, 
madrasas teach an outdated curriculum and focus on rote learning rather than critical study, 
but they provide the poor with an opportunity to advance themselves and have no record 
of producing violent Islamists.170 He further notes that because most schools have little or 
no connection to violent extremism the call for widespread religious education reform is 
therefore misplaced and will do little to counter international terrorism.171 
5. Challenges to Western CVE Education 
Finally, it is important to recognize that not all agree that the above education 
methods can effectively prevent extremism, especially considering their foundations in 
Western perspectives. For example, Magnus Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for 
Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defense College, argues that, since 
most experts who produce literature on CVE education come from Western countries, 
programs tend to align closely with modern Western liberal ideals.172 He states that the 
counter-terrorism literature is nearly devoid of non-Western points of view or competing 
interpretations, which makes it more difficult and more necessary to challenge the 
prevailing Western assumptions regarding violent extremism.173 Ranstorp also warns 
against implementing overtly Western models that compete against local customs and 
traditions, as they may risk reinforcing extremist anti-Western narratives that exacerbate 
the extremism problem rather than solve it.174 
                                                 
168 William Dalrymple, “Inside the Madrasas,” The New York Review of Books 52, no. 19 (December 
2005): 7. 
169 Dalrymple, 7–8. 
170 Dalrymple, 8–10. 
171 Dalrymple, 10–11. 
172 Magnus Ranstorp, ed., Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction, 
Cass Series: Political Violence (London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 8. 
173 Ranstorp, 9–10. 
174 Ranstorp, 10. 
38 
Similarly, education expert Henry A. Giroux argues that Western societies have 
begun to reduce social and political teachings in favor of abstract learning within 
schools.175 He claims that when schools remove the social and political basis of 
education—that is, character development and citizenship education—and replace it 
with technical education, schools become disconnected from society and are thus 
unable to act as agents of socio-cultural development.176 Giroux argues that for schools 
to revitalize a “noble and just society,” they have to reestablish this connection to 
citizenship education.177  
Education professor Michael Hand agrees with Giroux’s analysis and goes on to 
assert that modern Western theory cannot achieve the political goal of preventing violent 
extremism through education by focusing solely on abstract learning and skill 
development.178 Specifically, Hand argues against relying on critical thinking to combat 
extremism, concluding that individuals are just as likely to employ those cognitive skills 
to justify undesirable decisions, including joining a violent extremist organization, as they 
are to make decisions favorable to the educator’s aims.179 
Still others argue against relying on any form of education to prevent extremism. 
Beza Tesfaye, Conflict and Governance Research Manager at Mercy Corps, determined 
from research conducted in Somaliland that exposing youth to secondary education 
actually increased their support for politically-motivated violence, while adding civic 
engagement activities decreased overall support for violent groups. As a result, the Mercy 
Corps Somali Youth Leaders Initiative focuses on involving youth in civic action programs 
to motivate them to be productive citizens in the community and reject violence.180 
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The lack of empirical evidence to support CVE programs also confounds efforts to 
prove or disprove competing theories and programs based off results from the field.181 
Researchers at the Australian Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre contend 
that the difficulty in gathering and analyzing data related to educational programs 
in conflict zones prevents empirically testing the effectiveness of these programs.182  
This issue leads some proponents to rely on measures of performance—such as the number 
of schools built or enrolled students—or anecdotal evidence to justify their CVE 
educational programs.183  
Trees Pels and Doret J. de Ruyter, psychologists at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 
emphasize the need to address the lack of research into the relationship between 
educational systems and the onset of radicalization in Muslim communities in particular.184 
Pels and de Ruyter assert that not enough is known about the causes of radicalization, 
including the role that negative authority figures may play in the radicalization of Muslim 
youth, or how Muslim communities typically respond to children being influenced by 
violent extremist narratives.185 Pels and de Ruyter argue that more empirical research needs 
to be conducted on the content and style of education in Muslim communities to determine 
the best way ahead for CVE education.186 With little consensus on how, or whether, to use 
education to prevent extremism, and the lack of evaluation regarding the effectiveness of 
CVE education, further research and analysis of historical programs is needed to determine 
an optimal methodology for future application.  
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B. SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND CVE EDUCATION 
This section uses the analytical framework proposed in Chapter II to evaluate which 
of these programs incorporates the principles of socialization theory—or the process of 
indoctrinating individuals to social norms and standards of the group—when constructing 
their curriculum goals. According to Hadden and Long, the most important attribute that 
these socializing agents produce within new members is a sense of commitment, or the 
faithful realization of the principles of the group in all actions of its members and their 
willingness to be held accountable in doing so.187 This theory is significant for CVE 
education programs because it explains how children are either raised to become well-
adjusted members of a community or how violent extremist organizations integrate new 
members into patterns of radicalism. The framework draws on Long’s and Hadden’s five 
criteria—showing (demonstrating the values of the group), shaping (reinforcing 
commitment to those social values), recruiting (identifying and attracting new members), 
certifying (validating commitment to group values), and placing (incorporating members 
into the group)—to help identify and analyze specific socializing aspects of the four CVE 
education programs described above. 
1. Analysis of Vocational Training Programs 
Vocational training aims to combat economic drivers of violent extremism rather 
than a social cause, so it understandably focuses on teaching job skills instead of addressing 
the social behaviors and ideological motivations of the students. The programs briefly 
discussed above, therefore, have no stated social objectives. Furthermore, the shaping 
activity is also lacking in vocational training programs. For instance, the World Bank 
Group focus on providing technical skills with the expectation that “social inclusiveness” 
will result from the students holding jobs within their community. Therefore, their 
programs do not introduce or reinforce any social values that help students integrate into 
their community or avoid violent extremist organizations regardless any favorable 
economic incentives they may offer. 
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Despite lacking showing and shaping activities, vocational programs excel in 
recruiting, certifying, and placing. The programs draw in young students with opportunities 
to learn modern technologies and techniques, particularly in digital media use, and most 
programs actively link students to the local business community. The Tujengane Tuinuane 
program mentioned above, for example, assists with placing graduates into positions with 
local employers or starting their own businesses, as well as helps students with registering 
and interacting with the government. These activities strengthen the students’ ties to their 
community and provide a viable alternative to the economic incentives offered by violent 
extremist organizations. 
2. Analysis of Critical Thinking Programs 
Critical thinking CVE educational programs offer a strong showing activity overall. 
They promote the deeply-held Western values described in Chapter II of rationality, 
secularism, individualism, and openness to a plurality of ideas. The Creative Curriculum 
Program (CCP) serves as a representative example of this activity by seeking to develop 
creative problem solving, critical thinking, tolerance, and empathy within students as a 
means to counter violent extremism in Nigeria. 
Shaping in this approach seems to habituate the use of critical thinking skills, which 
Macaluso argues is critical for overall development, but explicitly eschews instilling any 
single communal identity or set of values. The CCP follows this trend by having students 
practice individual cognitive skills to analyze extremist narratives rather than addressing 
how their values compare to the social customs and expectations of the communities in 
which they live. This position is problematic because—as Giroux, Hand, Hadden and Long 
all argue—providing only abstract knowledge without a foundation of values allows 
students to choose conflicting ideologies, including those of a violent extremist 
organization. 
Like shaping, certifying appears in this program only at the individual level and 
relates to a cognitive skill rather than a set of communal values. For example, the CCP 
validates the students’ abilities to apply critical thinking skills to problems and seeks to 
develop confidence within students to investigate and challenge opposing viewpoints in 
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their communities. Critical to socialization theory, however, it does not seek to build a 
shared set of values within the students or help them integrate into Nigerian society.  
Recruiting and placing also appear deliberately weak in the critical thinking 
approach, where individual autonomy takes precedence over social cohesion. The CCP, for 
instance, has no connection to the Nigerian community outside of the schools in which it 
operates, nor does it include follow-on activities or resources for its students after 
graduation. Overall, while critical thinking skills include a strong showing activity, the 
programs described above do not appear to offer the other necessary socialization aspects 
of shaping, recruiting, certifying, or placing.  
3. Analysis of Exposure to Diversity Programs 
The exposure to diversity approach focuses on the showing activity as the primary 
means of socializing students. These programs introduce students to a wide range of points 
of view, lifestyles, and ideals through face-to-face encounters or social media platforms, 
and, while not advocating for any one set of collective values in particular, they do promote 
understanding and open-mindedness. Both Generation Global and UNESCO promote these 
values through encouraging interaction between diverse cultures and introducing the 
concept of global citizenship. This considerable exposure to alternative viewpoints also 
assists in recruiting, where students witness the potential benefits of global citizenship and 
gain awareness of various communities of interest through the programs. 
Despite offering showing and recruiting activities, these programs offer limited 
exposure to shaping or certifying activities to reinforce these values. Specifically, students 
are not required to respond in a particular way to this information, such as demonstrating 
understanding and empathy for differing viewpoints. Generation Global, in particular, 
focuses on improving knowledge of different cultures but does not discuss how one should 
interpret and interact with conflicting points of view. This lack of shaping or certifying 
may be problematic because exposure to an alternate viewpoint does not automatically lead 
to acceptance of it; it is important to reinforce these alternative viewpoints with guidance 
on how to productively engage with opposing ideals and reconcile one’s beliefs with those 
of another. Sayyid Qutb, a founder of modern violent jihadism, serves as one example of 
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this point. His exposure to the “depravities” of Western society during his travels to the 
United States created tensions with his beliefs regarding virtuous living, and he received 
little guidance on how to peacefully engage with these competing cultural norms.188 As a 
result, Qutb instigated a global physical jihad in defense of his Islamist beliefs, citing his 
unmitigated exposure to Western society as a driving factor behind his decision to adopt 
and propagate a violent extremist ideology.189 
Placing is also largely absent. In most programs, students are provided the 
opportunity to communicate with others from different cultures but are not incorporated 
into any related community or organization upon completion of the program. For example, 
Generation Global operates only within the context of its virtual exchange seminars with 
no formal opportunities for further interaction between students outside of the program. 
4. Analysis of Religious Education Programs 
Religious education programs appear to offer the strongest showing and shaping 
activities of the four CVE approaches. The programs tend to perform these two activities 
by promoting a set of religiously-based communal values centered on tolerance, 
inclusivity, and nonviolence. The Convey program, for example, incorporates popular 
interactive media into existing religious schools that engage young students with the 
materials and concepts. 
Religious education programs also demonstrate shaping, both formally through the 
curriculum of the schools and informally through regular prayers, rituals, and practices that 
reinforce the lessons and values of the religious group. The Convey program, in particular, 
demonstrates this activity by requiring students to explore their religion and nationality as 
an integral part of a modern and diverse society. 
Recruiting and certifying within these programs tend to occur automatically since 
they operate within existing religious schools, like the Islamic secondary schools linked to 
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the Convey program through the State Islamic University in Indonesia. However, one 
potential limitation is that the programs do not appear to assist in recruiting or placing 
students into a specific religious group or community-based organization outside of the 
school. Nor do the programs deliberately focus on building social confidence between 
students and members of the community. This limitation is evident in the Convey 
program’s unidirectional approach to religious education, where it provides materials to 
schools but does not directly interact with the students or connect them to like-minded 
religious institutions outside the school. 
Analysis of the four CVE education approaches described in this chapter reveals 
several trends in socializing characteristics. Table 2 summarizes the five socializing 
activities from the analytical framework across the four CVE educational approaches. The 
critical thinking, exposure to diversity, and religious education programs all feature strong 
showing activities as part of their educational programs; only vocational training is 
excluded. This implies that the programs have a set of collective ideals to offer, even if 
they do not actually commit the students to those values. The overall lack of evidence for 
recruiting, certifying, and placing activities in the CVE approaches is understandable 
considering the educational context of this analysis. Logically these activities would appear 
stronger in programs that link directly to follow-on organizations, such as in vocational 
training programs that prepare students for particular job opportunities in their community.  
Shaping activities are limited across all forms of Western CVE education programs 
except religious education, which directly connects to existing religious schools. Shaping 
is important because it serves as the fundamental activity that habituates the students’ 
commitment to the desired values and behaviors while in school. It should be noted, 
however, that informal, ad hoc socializing activities, particularly shaping activities, may 
occur in these programs without being recorded in published studies. Overall, while all 
four programs display some strong socializing activities, none displays strong evidence for 
all five. 
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This chapter surveyed four major approaches to Western CVE education: critical 
thinking skills, exposure to diversity, vocational training, and religious education. It then 
analyzed their strengths and weaknesses compared to the analytical framework from 
Chapter II, which is based on socialization theory and identifies showing, shaping, 
recruiting, certifying, and placing as fundamental socializing activities.  
The next chapter analyzes the socializing functions of the Salafi school system in 
Indonesia to identify characteristics of the program that have successfully committed 
students to the organization’s values and furthered its goals in the country. 
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IV. CASE STUDY: SALAFI SCHOOLS IN INDONESIA 
The Salafi school network in Indonesia serves as a useful example of how formal 
education can instill a particular set of communal values in support of a group’s socio-
political objectives. According to sociologist Chris Chaplin, Saudi Arabia’s da’wa 
activities—or religious outreach—started in Indonesia around the 1980s and have impacted 
the political and social discourse in the country.190 He argues that Salafi educational 
institutions in Indonesia have helped propagate “the importance of the [Saudi] kingdom as 
a source of educational sponsorship but also, more interestingly, as a source of religious 
authority and social ideals.”191 Similarly, anthropologist Din Wahid notes that currently 
only around fifty of the roughly 37,000 religious schools in Indonesia identify as Salafi, 
yet this small network of schools has exerted influence in the country and garnered both 
opposition and support within the community.192 Moreover, Amanda Kovacs, researcher 
at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, argues that these schools and their 
influence have contributed to the Islamization and Arabization of Indonesian society in 
addition to causing tension between Salafis and traditional Muslim groups in the 
country.193  
This chapter investigates the development and educational activities of the Salafi 
school system in Indonesia with the aim of studying how it has used social processes to 
spread a particular understanding of Islam and the specific social values that accompany 
it. The chapter draws from fieldwork conducted by anthropologists Din Wahid and Martin 
van Bruinessen, scholar of political Islam Noorhaidi Hasan, and education expert Uzma 
Ansar, as well as other independent studies of Salafi schools in Indonesia. It begins with a 
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discussion on Salafism in Indonesia and Saudi Arabia’s support of Salafism in particular. 
It then outlines the effects Salafi schools have had on Indonesian society, namely the 
increasing Islamization and Arabization of the country. The chapter then describes the 
specific ideology, methodology, curriculum, and outreach activities found in the Salafi 
school network. Finally, using the framework from Chapter II, which focuses on the five 
socializing activities of showing, shaping, recruiting, certifying, and placing, the chapter 
identifies how the Salafi school network commits students to specific communal values 
that advance its socio-religious objectives in Indonesia. 
The chapter finds that these Salafi schools act as strong socializing agents by 
performing all five socializing activities as outlined in the analytical framework. The 
schools feature a strong, simple, and unambiguous vision of Islam, a tight-knit community, 
and religious legitimacy through their connection to Saudi Arabia as a prominent religious 
authority in the Muslim world. The schools suffer some limitations as socializing agents, 
however, due to their adversarial tone and exclusivist mentality. Nevertheless, they are able 
to socialize commitment to a closed communal identity that refuses to operate within the 
secular political system, segregates itself from society, and antagonizes traditional 
establishments.  
A. SALAFISM AND SAUDI INFLUENCE IN INDONESIA 
Since its emergence in the 1980s, the Salafi movement in Indonesia has developed 
a reputation for creating significant tension and, at times, violence in communities across 
the country.194 This section begins by providing a very brief definition of Salafism, and 
why it is inherently conflictual with the forms of Islam practiced in Indonesia. It then 
highlights some of the approaches that Salafi groups have used to spread their 
understanding of the faith, and the tensions that have occurred since the emergence of 
Salafism in the country, including the arrival of Salafi schools. 
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Political scientist Quintan Wiktorowicz describes Salafism as a strict and literalist 
understanding of Sunni Islam.195 The basic tenets of Salafism include the emphasis on 
tawhid (the oneness of God), the need to submit to the absolute truth of the Qur’an, the 
hadith and the Sunna (the sayings and traditions of the Prophet), and to reject anything 
related to the “corrupting” influence of modern secular culture.196 Salafis also tend to 
strictly regulate behavior, enforce gender segregation, and advocate for social separation 
from non-believers.197 
Several scholars, including Wiktorowicz, Wahid, and Hasan, argue that Salafism is 
difficult to precisely define because, despite its insistence on one understanding of the faith, 
it is not a single, monolithic and homogenous movement.198 Wictorowicz identifies three 
subtypes of Salafis in particular: purists, who are politically quietist and focus primarily on 
maintaining the purity of Islam within society; politicos, the generally younger Salafis who 
prefer to apply Salafi doctrine through the political process to effect change within current 
regimes; and jihadis, who advocate for using violence to establish fundamentalist Islamic 
states.199 Wictorowicz contends that, despite these differences in action, all Salafi 
movements share the similar core set of beliefs outlined above.200  According to Hasan and 
Chaplin, most Salafis avoid the political process, and instead believe in gradually 
“Salafizing” Muslim society through education and purification as a precondition for being 
able to fully implement shari’a, Islam’s legal code, in the country.201 
Indonesia hosts a variety of Salafi groups with differing methodologies for 
spreading their understanding of the faith. These movements range from apolitical groups 
to politically-active groups like the Justice and Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan 
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Sejahtera, or PKS), to those with Salafi theological orientations that also embrace 
nationalist and pluralistic ideas, as well as a few violent groups, like Laskar Jihad.202 In 
addition, anthropologist Martin van Bruinessen points out that the use of the term “Salafi” 
in Indonesia has caused some confusion because its meaning differs from the term 
“Salafiyah”—which translates as “in the way of previous generations”—used by most 
traditional non-Salafi religious schools in Indonesia.203 Van Bruinessen states that both 
terms relate to “al-salaf al-salih” or “the pious predecessors,” but otherwise represent 
opposite extremes of the Islamic religious spectrum in Indonesia.204 
Sociologist William Racimora observes that the Indonesian government has had 
difficulties recognizing and regulating the various Salafi groups in Indonesia because of 
the diverse approaches of the different groups, each of which considers themselves the true 
authority on Salafism in the country.205 Racimora argues that these distinctions became 
even more pronounced after the Bali bombings in 2002 and the subsequent government 
crackdown on groups that the Indonesian government identified as supporting radical 
Islamic terrorism.206 The government’s response to the bombings included monitoring and 
restricting the flow of Arab funds, mainly from Saudi Arabia, to Islamic organizations in 
Indonesia. The reduction of funds, in turn, increased competition between Indonesian 
Salafi groups over the remaining financial resources.207 According to Racimora, the groups 
adopted increasingly radical Salafi ideologies in an attempt to distinguish themselves from 
other organizations and win Saudi support.208 
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Several scholars note that broadly speaking, the growth of the Salafi movement 
around the world correlates with Saudi Arabia’s recent rise as a dominant political actor.209 
Hassan, for example, argues that Saudi Arabia generates support for its regime and 
promulgates its religious philosophy by funding the construction of new mosques, Islamic 
schools, and other outreach activities through Islamic organizations abroad, presenting 
these expenditures as acts of solidarity, piety, and brotherhood with the ummah, or global 
Islamic community.210 Kovacs identifies Saudi Arabia as the world’s foremost provider of 
Islamic education which seeks to “create global alliances and legitimize the Saudi claim to 
be the leader of Islam – at home and abroad” through its educational outreach programs.211 
Kovacs argues that Indonesia holds particular strategic interest to Saudi Arabia as 
the world’s largest Muslim country, especially in the context of Saudi-Iranian competition 
since the 1979 Shia revolution in Iran.212 In addition to sending the largest number of 
pilgrims to Mecca for Hajj, which is a significant source of tourism money for Saudi 
Arabia, Kovacs contends that Indonesia acts as the Saudi Kingdom’s gateway to the 
Muslim community of Southwest Asia.213 In support of these interests, Saudi Arabia has 
funded the construction of dozens of Salafi madrasas throughout Indonesia, supports the 
political and educational outreach activities of Salafi organizations like the Indonesian 
Council for Islamic Propagation (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII), finances the 
Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic (LIPIA) in Jakarta (an Indonesian branch of the 
Imam Muhammad bin Saud University), and provides scholarships for thirty students to 
travel to Saudi Arabia for advanced education every year.214 In addition, the kingdom 
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provides teachers, textbooks, and other materials for madrasas as a means of controlling 
the content presented in the schools.215 
Hasan notes that Salafi schools mirror the greater Salafi movement in Indonesia in 
that they do not comprise a single homogenous institution, but rather a fragmented network 
of schools, each holding a slightly divergent interpretation of Salafi doctrine, which 
compete with each other for Arab funding.216 Like Tan and Racimora, Hasan argues that 
these schools have had a direct influence on the development of exclusionary social groups 
and generated political, social, and religious conflict within Indonesian society.217 
According to Hasan, these initiatives have sparked a debate regarding Islamic reform in 
Indonesia, challenged the aims of established Indonesian Muslim organizations like al-
Irsyad and Persis, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and Muhammadiyah, and extracted their support 
for transforming Indonesia into a “fully Islamic society.”218 To complicate matters further, 
Hasan argues that many religious scholars within these organizations continue to accept 
the legitimacy of Saudi-sponsored institutions as partners in da’wa “for the glorification of 
Islam…in Indonesia” despite the growing challenge these transnational efforts pose to their 
traditional religious authority.219 To illustrate how these schools have managed to generate 
this effect, the next section focuses on the activities of the network of Salafi schools in 
Indonesia as of 2018.220 
B. THE SALAFI SCHOOL CURRICULUM 
Over the last twenty-five years, Salafi schools have emerged throughout Indonesia, 
funded by a variety of organizations. According to Hasan, Saudi Arabia currently funnels 
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money into Indonesia through several Islamic charities, including Hai’at al-Ighatha al-
Islamiyya al-’Alamiyya (International Islamic Relief Organization), al-Majlis al-’Alami li 
al-Masajid (World Council of Mosques), al-Nadwa al-’Alamiyya li al-Shabab al-Islami 
(World Assembly of Muslim Youth), and Lajna Birr al-Islami (Committee of Islamic 
Charity), primarily intended for DDII to establish schools and other social institutions.221 
Hasan states that the Ihya al-Sunna, established in 1994 in Yogyakarta, is the oldest such 
school in Indonesia, succeeded by the al-Turath al-Islami in 1995, followed by dozens of 
other schools that opened after that, especially after the fall of the Suharto regime in 
1998.222 
Hasan contends that these Salafi schools are readily distinguishable from other 
Indonesian Islamic schools like pesantren (Islamic boarding schools that focus primarily 
on religious education), and the indigenous Indonesian madrasah, or Islamic primary 
schools that encompass both secular and religious subjects and can be either private or 
under the direction of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.223 Specifically, these schools teach 
an explicitly Saudi-style Salafi Islam, which focuses on “strict monotheism, anti-Sufism, 
as well as typical Arab-style dress, exclusivist tendencies and rigid ritual practices” and 
serves to support both the spread of Salafi religious ideas and the more general Arabization 
of Indonesian society.224 In addition, according to Hasan, male and female students are 
always strictly segregated on campus, and girls’ education focuses on “behavior, fashion, 
gender relations and methods of taking care of husbands and children” in addition to 
Islamic theology and jurisprudence.225 
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Hasan further argues that the Salafi school system in Indonesia eschews local 
traditional religious authority and instead links directly to religious authorities in the 
Middle East, and Saudi Arabia in particular.226 For instance, most Indonesian Muslims 
defer to the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), an independent 
Islamic judicial committee comprised of Islamic scholars from Indonesian Muslin groups, 
including both NU and Muhammadiyah, that issue fatwas (religious legal opinions) 
relating to Muslim matters in Indonesia.227 Salafi schools have no representation on the 
council, nor do they recognize its authority or judgments; instead, the schools have 
followed the directions of Saudi authorities, such as ‘Abd al-’Aziz ‘Abd Allah bin Baz and 
Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani.228 Wahid also observed this connection to the Middle 
East in his study of Salafi schools in Indonesia. He states that many Salafi educators, having 
received their education in the Middle East, preserve their link to their former teachers by 
sending students to study with them, asking them for fatwas on religious affairs in 
Indonesia, and even inviting them to visit Indonesia to teach.229 Finally, the exclusivist 
mentality of the Salafi schools contrasts with both the pesantren and non-Salafi madrasahs, 
which Hasan credits with propagating a pluralistic religious identity within Indonesia.230 
Apart from these distinctions, Salafi schools share several similarities with other 
non-Salafi institutions. Education expert Uzma Anzar notes that the Salafi schools’ 
teaching methodology and daily schedule resemble other Islamic schools in Indonesia.231 
Hasan describes the daily routine: Each school educates between seventy and 120 children, 
aged seven to seventeen, and classes usually go from eight o’clock in the morning until 
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evening prayer at seven o’clock.232 The classroom is run as an informal teacher-scholar 
approach; the students listen and take notes while the teacher lectures and reads from texts, 
explains the meaning of passages, and expounds on the lesson topic with relevant 
illustrations and examples.233 After the lessons, students are allowed to ask questions and 
then complete activities relevant to the period of instruction, such as homework on general 
subjects, reading and memorizing assigned theological texts, or practicing Arabic language 
phrases.234 
Salafi schools feature a graded system based on the classification developed by the 
Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs and incorporate both religious and secular 
subjects, including Indonesian language, mathematics, natural and social sciences, and 
some vocational skills.235 At the end of each grade, all students are expected to master the 
foundations of Salafi doctrine and commit to living in accordance with Salafi principles, 
but must also pass a national exam to receive a certificate of compulsory primary education 
from the Ministries of Religious Affairs and National Education.236 Azra, Afrianty, and 
Hefner surmise that the inclusion of secular subjects and the national exams are a response 
to the Indonesian National Law on Education.237 The law identifies all Islamic schools in 
the country as part of the national education system and, therefore, are required to meet 
national education curriculum standards, including holding the national exams.238 In 
addition, adhering to the national standard helps elevate the Salafi schools to the same level 
as general schools and makes the  students more competitive for attending university.239 
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Despite the inclusion of secular subjects and national exams, Anzar asserts that the 
real focus within Salafi schools is on religious education.240 As is common to most 
traditional madrasas, focus is placed on understanding Islamic principles that govern daily 
life, such as fiqh (Islamic law), the hadith and Sunna, and logic.241 Salafi schools’ religious 
curriculum particularly emphasizes the understanding of tawhid through the study of 
certain Islamic theological texts, including the Kitab al-Tawhid and al-Usul al-Thalatha 
by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, a Saudi cleric from the eighteenth century.242 In some 
cases, students must memorize these texts before moving on to other studies.243 Many of 
these texts are provided free of charge by LIPIA, a Saudi Arabian entity, which allows the 
organization to exert significant influence over the content and teachings within the 
schools.244 
The curriculum also includes teachings on the importance of “al-wala’ wa-l-
babra”—or “allegiance to Islam and renunciation of unbelievers”—which, according to 
Hasan, theoretically defines the role of Muslims in protecting each other and denouncing 
infidels and provides the basis for Salafis segregating themselves from the general 
public.245 References to kafir (unbelievers; essentially anyone who does not subscribe to 
Salafism) and taghut (idolatry and non-adherence to the shari’a) appear in the school 
curriculum as the “source of error and destruction” which the students can avoid only 
through submission to shari’a and segregation into a community of believers.246 As stated 
above, although these Salafi principles do not directly support violent extremism, 
anthropologist Mark Woodward warns that, by calling for exclusion and open enmity 
                                                 
240 Anzar, 7. 
241 Wahid, 371; Anzar, 7. 
242 Hasan, “The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign,” 687. 
243 Hasan, 687. 
244 Hasan, “The Salafi Movement in Indonesia,” 89. 
245 Hasan, “The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign,” 687. 
246 Woodward, 243; Hasan, “The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign,” 687–88. 
57 
towards unbelievers, including fellow Muslims, this doctrine could be construed by some 
as legitimizing radicalism and physical jihad.247 
The curriculum also contributes to the Arabization of the student body. Since most 
of the texts studied in the Salafi schools are in Arabic, students must also study the Arabic 
language.248 Generally, the schools use the same popular Arabic lesson materials found in 
traditional Indonesian pesantren, but also include the al-’Arabiyya li al-Nashi’in, a 
comprehensive Arabic textbook provided free-of-charge by the Saudi Arabian embassy.249 
School administrators also see Arabic competency as necessary for empowering students 
and facilitating their further study in the Middle East.250 In addition to teaching Arabic, the 
schools encourage students to wear traditional Arab clothing, including long beards for 
male students, Arab-style jalabiyya robes, calf-length trousers, and black veils that cover 
the face for women when in public.251 According to Woodward, clothing acts as an 
important and highly visible representation of one’s personal and collective identity.252 He 
claims that by having students dress “as the Prophet Muhammad did,” Salafi schools are 
attempting to attach Arab cultural symbols to universal religious concepts.253 This tactic 
has had some success in Arabizing students, as one student expressed to Woodward, “it is 
obligatory for Muslims to follow the Prophet Muhammad in every possible way, and the 
best way to do this is to follow the practices of contemporary Saudi Arabians.”254 
Woodward argues that by relating Arab dress to being a proper Muslim, these schools are 
working to restructure Indonesian society to reflect Saudi-style religious ideals.255 
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In addition to their focus on educating students, Salafi school faculty also plan 
lessons, activities, and study groups within the local community, usually at local mosques 
or in private residences.256 Hasan claims that this tactic helps recruit new students and 
educate the local populace on Salafi philosophy and practices.257 Additionally, some 
schools operate radio stations to expose the local populace to the basic tenets of 
Salafism.258 Hasan argues that this form of activism—working through social networks 
rather than institutional ones—facilitates the Arabization and Islamization of local 
communities at the grassroots level and avoids the governmental oversight and restrictions 
on the movement.259 
Hasan further notes that despite these outreach activities, the Salafi school’s 
“exclusivist and self-limiting character” has somewhat restricted its ability to generate 
popular support for the Salafi worldview in local villages.260 He contends that many 
surrounding villagers still see these schools as separate, foreign, and unfriendly.261 The 
Salafi faculty’s persistent recruiting efforts, their insistence that Salafism constitutes 
“authentic” Islam, and vocal criticism of local practices particularly aggravate village 
elders.262 Still, according to Hasan, their message has resonated with many disaffected 
youths looking for independence and a sense of empowerment.263 Additionally, the Salafi 
schools provide an alternative means for poor rural children to receive an education and 
offer a tight-knit community for those seeking social inclusion.264 During his fieldwork 
among Indonesian Salafi schools, Wahid also witnessed the initially hostile reactions of 
local villagers to the establishment of Salafi schools in their area.265 For example, local 
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authorities forcibly disbanded the al-Furqan school in Srowo (East Java) in 1994 and 
villagers attacked the al-Nur al-Atsari school in Banjarsari (West Java) in 2002.266 Over 
time, however, the presence of these schools normalized somewhat, and many schools have 
since amplified their outreach activities within local communities.267 
Woodward attributes the success of the Salafi schools’ recruiting efforts to the 
relative simplicity of their doctrine as well as their connection to Saudi Arabia.268 The 
schools provide students with a clearly defined vision of Islam, an unambiguous code of 
conduct that regulates social and religious practices, and simple instructions that take little 
effort to follow.269 Woodward reports that many students he interviewed considered the 
Salafi teachings more legitimate than local customs, believing that the messages must be 
true because they came from Mecca.270 Hasan notes that even though the schools have 
faced some difficulties in recruiting for and expanding the Salafi network, the indirect 
effect the schools have had on the local community is evident. During his review of local 
villages in Solo in 2010, Hasan recorded an increased awareness of the importance of 
religion, an increase in the number of practicing Muslims, and an increase in women 
wearing headscarves in villages near a Salafi school.271 
Some scholars, including Wahid, Tan, Kovacs, and Racimora, argue that the 
expansion of Salafi da’wa activities throughout Indonesia correlates with an increase in 
conflict between traditional Muslims and Salafis in the country and that Salafi schools, in 
particular, have played a role in the rise of radical Islam in Indonesia.272 One example is 
the Salafi Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) which, according to 
Kovacs, has been responsible for a number of violent acts against Muslim minorities since 
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1999.273 Modeled after the Saudi religious police, the FPI targets “un-Islamic” institutions 
like nightclubs and restaurants that serve alcohol, as well as members of the Liberal Islam 
Network (Jaringan Islam Libera, JIL).274 Another example is Salafi school leader Ja’far 
Umar Thalib, who established a paramilitary force, Laskar Jihad, which called for armed 
jihad against Christians as well as the Indonesian government from 2000 to 2003.275 
Others, however, including van Bruinessen, argue that the link between Salafi schools and 
violent extremism is tenuous, and little empirical evidence exists to attribute these violent 
actions to the internal activities of the schools themselves.276 
Irrespective of the schools’ supposed link to violent extremism, Kovacs contends 
that the Salafi schools have had a far-reaching impact in the country. She argues that they 
have the ability to provoke social change at the national level, with significant 
consequences for Indonesian society: 
The Saudi educational institutes’ support for Salafism and glorification of 
Saudi rule challenge the host countries’ educational traditions; Saudi 
transnational educational establishments become reservoirs for Islamist 
ideologies that question the host society’s status quo and the right of other 
religious communities to exist. Collaboration between Saudi and local 
institutions and organizations is particularly insidious for secular or 
religiously pluralist societies, and countries that do not invest in educational 
systems remain open to Saudi influence. As the politically radical Salafi 
movements show, the Saudi educational offerings could challenge the 
legitimacy of the Indonesian state, and even lead to political uprisings.277 
Kovacs argues that, despite the challenge posed by these Salafi school activities over the 
last several decades, the Indonesian government still has an opportunity to counter it 
through investing in education that supports democratic values and religious pluralism.278 
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As discussed above, the Salafi school system in Indonesia uses both secular and 
religious instruction to expand, normalize, and spread Salafi identity throughout the 
country. The schools’ ability to recruit students to their cause and integrate them into 
exclusivist social groups in opposition to traditional Indonesian society has had a marked 
influence on the political, religious, and social discourse in Indonesia, which at times has 
resulted in conflict and violence. The next section analyzes the specific socializing aspects 
of the schools’ curricula and activities that contribute to their ability to influence the 
Indonesian population. 
C. SOCIALIZATION ANALYSIS OF SALAFI SCHOOLS 
This section uses the analytical framework proposed in Chapter II to evaluate how 
Salafi schools incorporate the principles of socialization theory—or the process of 
indoctrinating individuals to social norms and standards of the group—when constructing 
their curriculum goals. According to Hadden and Long, the most important attribute that 
these socializing agents produce within new members is a sense of commitment, or the 
faithful realization of the principles of the group in all actions of its members and their 
willingness to be held accountable in doing so.279 This theory is significant for studying 
the Salafi school system in Indonesia because it explains how children are raised to become 
members of an alternative community and how these organizations instill a set of 
exclusionary values within new members that generate conflict within the society in which 
they live. The framework draws on Long’s and Hadden’s five criteria—showing 
(demonstrating the values of the group), shaping (reinforcing commitment to those social 
values), recruiting (identifying and attracting new members), certifying (validating 
commitment to group values), and placing (incorporating members into the group)—to 
help identify and analyze specific socializing aspects of the Salafi schools described above. 
Like the CVE religious education programs analyzed in Chapter III, Salafi schools 
offer a strong showing activity in their curriculum by promoting Salafi values and standards 
of behavior. As Woodward states, the schools provide a simple and unambiguous 
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understanding of Islam linked to Arab religious authority, and offer an idealized version of 
the Saudi social structure as the definitive example of pious Islamic living. The schools 
present these values as the core principles that govern daily life, which include a dedication 
to tawhid, fiqh, the hadith and Sunna, submission to shari’a, segregation of the sexes, 
specialized roles for girls as homemakers, isolation of the Salafi community from 
nonbelievers, and replicating Arab culture, language, and clothing styles to promote a 
Salafi collective identity. These ideals are also reinforced in the school textbooks and by 
the guest instructors from the Middle East who share similar values. 
The strength of the showing activity in the Salafi schools is tempered somewhat 
outside the classroom. Their exclusivist and isolationist attitude, enmity towards so-called 
unbelievers, and open hostility towards local customs limit the reach of the schools’ 
showing activities, although these limitations hardly affect students once they are enrolled 
in the curriculum. Overall, however, the schools show a robust set of religious and 
communal values and set clear expectations for their students to follow. 
The shaping activity also features prominently in the schools’ curriculum. Students 
develop habits that adhere to the social and religious principles of the school through their 
daily routine and classroom studies, which have both an Islamizing and Arabizing effect 
on the students and on the local community. Some examples of these activities include 
memorizing passages and texts relating to the desired principles, learning and using the 
Arabic language, wearing Arab style clothing, strict gender segregation, and separating 
themselves as much as possible from “non-believers” in the local community. Teachers 
reinforce these behaviors in class during their lectures and afterward during question and 
answer sessions and through homework assignments, as well as through their educational 
outreach activities in the community that reinforce their ideas outside the schools. 
The recruiting activity for the Salafi school system contains both strong and weak 
elements. The schools actively recruit within local communities through educational 
outreach activities such as sermons and lessons at local mosques, as well as running radio 
programs to spread their message. As described above, the schools’ link to Saudi Arabia 
serves as a strong recruiting tool because of the legitimacy gained from being connected to 
the kingdom and the holy sites of Mecca and Medina. The relative simplicity of the Salafi 
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message and easy-to-follow guidelines also aid in recruiting students with limited existing 
religious knowledge. As Hasan states, the schools also attract students from poor 
neighborhoods and disaffected youth looking for an alternative means of empowerment 
and social inclusion. The schools also recruit for Salafi universities in Indonesia, like 
LIPIA, and institutions in the Middle East through their connections with former religious 
teachers there. 
As with the showing activity, the schools’ exclusivist mentality and inflammatory 
rhetoric interfere with recruiting in local villages and, because of this, the schools must 
spend time normalizing their presence in the community to gain real benefit from their 
recruiting efforts. There also appears to be limited recruiting within the Salafi schools for 
any formal Salafi institutions or communities, other than universities, with which students 
can engage after graduation. The divergent interpretations of Salafi doctrine among the 
schools, coupled with their unwillingness to compromise may also limit recruiting for 
follow-on organizations if those groups subscribe to a slightly different version of Salafism. 
It seems likely, however, that the students’ informal recruitment into the global Salafi 
movement and opportunities for travel to the Middle East have an effect in exposing 
students to new Salafi organizations.  
Certifying in Salafi schools occurs both formally and informally. Formally, the 
schools test students at the end of every grade to ensure they have mastered the fundamental 
theological and practical aspects of Salafi doctrine before advancing them to the next grade. 
Informally, teachers certify a student’s commitment on a frequent basis, such as through 
classwork and testing their memorization of texts, as well as ensure that the students 
complete daily prayers and rituals, wear the proper clothing, and act as expected with 
regards to gender relations and their interactions with each other and the community. One 
weakness of the certifying activity within Salafi schools is that they will only instill social 
confidence in the students’ status among those members of the larger Salafi movement that 
adhere to the same strand of Salafism as the one taught in the school. Otherwise, it seems 
likely that a different community may reject the students for having divergent beliefs.  
Placing within the Salafi schools is present, but appears rather weak compared to 
the other socializing activities. Like recruiting, the schools perform placing by sending 
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students to Salafi universities and offering them opportunities to travel abroad. Informally, 
placing occurs within the schools as a new social system for the students and segregating 
them from Indonesian society, as well as by placing them into the global Salafi movement 
as dedicated members of that religious practice. Conversely, the schools seem to have little 
connection to any specific organizations or communities into which they can place students 
after graduation, which may limit their reach.  
Overall, the Salafi school system acts as a strong socializing agent by performing 
all five of the socializing activities described by Hadden and Long. Table 3 summarizes 
the five socializing activities of the Salafi schools in Indonesia. 
Table 3.   Analysis of Salafi School System Socializing Activities 
Socializing Activity Description of Activity within the Salafi School System 
Showing 
Strong religious and Saudi value system built around a simple, 
unambiguous vision of Islam linked to Arab religious authority, 
provides clear guidance for acceptable conduct. Somewhat 
limited by lack of positive exposure in the local community. 
Shaping 
Strong habituation of values through controlling the students’ 
daily routine, language, clothing, maintaining segregation 
between genders and separation from the local community, 
reinforced by teachers in and out of school. 
Recruiting 
Strong recruiting in the community, attractive to disaffected 
youth and the poor, legitimized through connection to Saudi 
Arabia. Limited by the schools’ adversarial and exclusivist 
nature and lack formal connections to follow-on groups. 
Certifying 
Strong formal testing of both ideological and academic content, 
consistent informal evaluation of behaviors. Builds confidence 
within students and some members of Salafi community, but 
limited by the divergence between different strands of Salafism. 
Placing 
Present by sending students to Salafi universities and abroad to 
Saudi Arabia, incorporates students into Salafi community 
within school, and informally into global Salafi movement, but 




This chapter outlined the origins and development of the Salafi movement in 
Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries’ efforts to Arabize and Islamize 
Indonesian society through da’wa activities, specifically through Salafi schools. It 
identified the background and mission of Salafi schools in Indonesia, the values and norms 
propagated through the schools’ curricula, and the effects of their social outreach activities 
in local communities. Finally, this chapter analyzed the socializing elements of the Salafi 
school system and found that it performs all five activities of showing, shaping, recruiting, 
certifying, and placing to instill commitment to a particular strand of Salafi values within 
the student body. While these schools do not promote violent extremist ideologies directly, 
their ability to socialize commitment to an exclusivist and intolerant communal identity—
especially one that refuses to operate within the secular political system, segregates itself 
from the local community, and antagonizes traditional establishments—has led to conflict 
between in Indonesian communities, shifted political, social, and religious discourse in the 
country, and contributed to the increasing Islamization and Arabization of Indonesian 
society. 
The next chapter studies the Muhammadiyah schools in Indonesia, which, in 
contrast to the Salafi schools, have propagated an open, pluralistic, nationalistic, and 
tolerant religious identity in Indonesia. An analysis of the socializing functions of the 
Muhammadiyah school system will identify characteristics that have successfully 
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V. CASE STUDY: MUHAMMADIYAH SCHOOLS 
The Muhammadiyah school system in Indonesia illustrates how formal education 
can be used to propagate an open, pluralistic, nationalistic, and tolerant religious identity 
within a country. Since its founding in 1912, Muhammadiyah has grown to become the 
second largest Muslim social institution in Indonesia, with more than 30 million members 
and 15,000 schools operating throughout the country.280 According to Muhammadiyah 
executive board member Sudibyo Markus, the organization’s large alumni community, 
which includes many prominent government and civil society leaders, spearheads the 
moderate movement in the Islamic world.281 Several scholars, including political scientists 
Jeremy Menchik, Wendy Wirawan, and Adhikatama, argue that Muhammadiyah schools 
have even contributed to the creation of a communal identity in Indonesia that supports the 
Indonesian government and its political philosophy, opposes the efforts of transnational 
Islamist movements in the country and prevents violent ideologies from taking hold in the 
community.282 
This chapter examines the socializing properties of Muhammadiyah’s educational 
institutions through materials provided by the Central Board of Muhammadiyah, research 
conducted by political scientists Jeremy Menchik, education expert Muhammad Fuad, and 
Indonesian scholars Agus Miswanto, Afrahul Daulai, and Ahmad Burhani, as well as 
additional secondary sources. The first section of this chapter outlines the organization’s 
history, ideology, development, and relationship with the Indonesian government. The 
second section describes the Muhammadiyah school system itself and details the typical 
daily activities, curricula, materials, and lessons of these institutions. It then describes the 
effects these schools have had on their students and Indonesian society as a whole. Finally, 
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the chapter analyzes the school system using the framework from Chapter II, which focuses 
on the five socializing activities of showing, shaping, recruiting, certifying, and placing to 
identify how it commits students to specific communal values that advance its ideas for 
Indonesian society. 
The chapter finds that Muhammadiyah schools act as strong socializing agents by 
performing all five socializing activities outlined in the analytical framework. The schools 
actively promote the values of modernism, nationalism, and tolerance within the 
curriculum, and work to instill these values using an “active learning” model and 
community service to help students internalize the underlying principles of the 
organization. Although some Muhammadiyah schools exhibit a limited capacity to 
socialize their religious beliefs, many limit religious socialization deliberately in favor of 
propagating an atmosphere of mutual respect and cooperation between diverse populations 
in support of Indonesian nationalism. 
A. THE MUHAMMADIYAH MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA 
Muhammadiyah was established in 1912 in Yogyakarta by Indonesian Islamic 
scholar Ahmad Dahlan and, according to Fuad, is an Islamic reformist movement that 
works through education to instill a modernist version of Islam in Indonesia.283 Before 
founding Muhammadiyah, Dahlan studied in the Middle East under Muslim scholars 
including Muhammad Rasyid Ridha, Jamaluddin al-Afghani, and Muhammad Abduh, and 
after returning to Indonesia, became a leader in the Muslim modernist movement in the 
country.284 Anthropologist Mark Woodward argues that Dahlan originally sought to 
provide high-quality education for indigenous Muslim children comparable to the Dutch 
or Christian missionary schools, which were either closed to Muslim children or considered 
undesirable by Muslim parents.285 Dahlan sought to merge aspects of the Western 
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education system—such as its teaching methods, organizational model, and the inclusion 
of modern secular topics like science—with Islamic teaching to produce an organization 
that would embrace modernity and nationalism while upholding Islamic values.286  
Dahlan established the first Muhammadiyah school in 1911 in Yogyakarta, a year 
before he founded the overarching Muhammadiyah organization as a means to expand his 
vision for educational outreach.287 By the 1930s, Muhammadiyah had built more than 
1,000 schools in several regions throughout Indonesia.288 According to Fuad, 
Muhammadiyah initially garnered support from middle-class Muslim merchants and 
traders, and as the school network expanded it received support from land-owning farmers 
as well. Economic changes after Indonesia’s independence in 1945 caused a decline in 
these groups, yet Muhammadiyah’s popularity continued to grow among civil servants and 
professionals.289 With many Muhammadiyah graduates moving on to earn advanced 
degrees over the next several decades, the Muhammadiyah community became one of the 
highest-educated Muslim groups in Indonesia.290 
Throughout the next century, despite competition from Christian missionaries, the 
emergence of more stringent Salafi Islamic groups and the founding of traditional 
Indonesian Muslim organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah managed 
to spread throughout the country to become the second largest private educational 
institution in Indonesia.291 As of 2018, according to the official Muhammadiyah website, 
the organization boasts over 30 million members, keeps 11,000 offices from the village to 
provincial level, operates hundreds of hospitals and clinics, maintains several universities, 
and runs over 15,000 schools from kindergarten level through high school in every region 
of the country.292 
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Woodward asserts that Muhammadiyah embraces core religious beliefs similar to 
the Salafi schools in Indonesia but is otherwise a profoundly different movement.293 
Specifically, Woodward argues that, like the Salafi schools, Muhammadiyah follows the 
teachings of nineteenth century Saudi cleric Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, particularly 
his focus on tawhid (the oneness of God), the hadith and Sunna (the sayings and deeds of 
the prophet Muhammad), and opposition to Sufism (mystical Islam) and bid’ah (religious 
innovation).294 Unlike the Salafis, however, Woodward states that Muhammadiyah is 
staunchly nationalist and displays an extraordinary amount of tolerance for aspects of 
Indonesian Islam that it officially eschews, such as visiting grave sites, praying for the 
dead, and celebrating Muhammad’s birthday.295 Woodward emphasizes that the 
organization is “deeply committed to the idea of Indonesia and the diversity of Indonesian 
cultures.”296 
Furthermore, as stated in the organization’s statutes and bylaws, Muhammadiyah 
does not advocate for the establishment of an Islamic state but instead seeks to “uphold and 
revere Islam so as to realize a real Islamic society” through good deeds, charity, and service 
based on the Qur’an and Sunna.297 The organization endeavors to foster faith and 
understanding in Islamic teachings, advance culture, science, technology, and the arts 
through education, increase health and welfare, and maintain national unity and members’ 
involvement in national life.298 Anthropologist Martin van Bruinessen asserts that these 
objectives drive Muhammadiyah to focus predominantly on social outreach and welfare 
activities, particularly formal education, rather than on political activism.299 
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Muhammadiyah also circulates a statement called “The Faith Pledge and 
Aspirations of Muhammadiyah Life” that details the organization’s mission and desired 
end state. It advocates for the realization of a society based in faith (that is, a “pure and 
untainted Islam” free from polytheism and human innovation, but also dedicated to 
tolerance for others based on Islamic principles), knowledge, morality, and muamalah (or 
fairness in social and economic dealings according to Islamic jurisprudence).300 The 
document also outlines Muhammadiyah’s support of the government in general and of 
Indonesia’s core values, or Pancasila: the belief in one God; a just and civilized humanity 
(specifically that Indonesia will not tolerate oppression of any type); national unity; 
representative democracy; and equity and social justice for all Indonesians.301 
Fuad argues that Muhammadiyah’s endorsement of Pancasila and its close 
connection to the Indonesian government reflects the organization’s long history of 
working through the state to operate and expand.302 Muhammadiyah’s steady compliance 
has won it favor in the form of subsidies for teachers’ salaries and relatively little 
interference from successive governments, including the Dutch colonial government, 
Sukarno’s government following Indonesia’s independence, Suharto’s New Order regime, 
and the new republican government since Suharto’s overthrow in 1998.303 Interestingly, 
while this relationship laid the foundations for the organization’s rapid growth and rising 
influence in Indonesian society, it also encouraged moderation within the organization 
itself as a means to avoid political suppression.304 Finally, Fuad contends that 
Muhammadiyah’s support for Pancasila and close ties to the Indonesian government 
contributed to the organization adopting a nationalist philosophy, which further 
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distinguishes the movement from transnational groups operating in Indonesia, particularly 
the Salafi schools described in Chapter IV.305  
The organization continues to grow and seeks to expand beyond Indonesia’s 
borders; in November 2017, Muhammadiyah chairman Haedar Nashir announced plans to 
establish a school in Melbourne, Australia, consisting of a preschool, an elementary school, 
junior high, and high school to service both the Australian Muslim population and 
Indonesian students wanting to study abroad.306 
B. THE MUHAMMADIYAH CURRICULUM 
The strength of the Muhammadiyah school system is its ability to operate at the 
local level. Officially, the Muhammadiyah school system follows a rigid hierarchy with 
strict regulations set by the national office.307 In practice, however, the organization grants 
significant latitude at the local level to build and develop educational programs. Local 
branches enjoy this autonomy from the national office partly because they must apply their 
own financial resources towards new school initiatives rather than appeal to the higher 
office for support.308 Since the bulk of funding for educational institutions comes from 
private donations collected and managed at the local level, requirements and expectations 
must also represent the interests of local donors.309 Fuad argues that this bottom-up 
approach to educational development creates natural ties between the Muhammadiyah 
school and the local community, which has, in part, underscored the institution’s success 
over the last 100 years.310 
                                                 
305 Fuad, 405. 
306 Sri Wahyuni, “Muhammadiyah to Establish Islamic Schools in Australia,” The Jakarta Post, 
November 27, 2017, Online edition, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/11/27/muhammadiyah-to-
establish-islamic-schools-in-australia.html. 
307 Fuad, 401. 
308 Fuad, 401. 
309 Fuad, 401–2. 
310 Fuad, 401–2. 
73 
Daulai asserts that the schools seek to create a cadre of civic leaders who are neither 
secular nor resistant to social progress.311 The schools recognize and embrace the inclusion 
of modern secular subjects to prepare their students to adapt to advances in science and 
technology and thrive in Indonesia’s rapidly evolving social environment.312 According to 
Daulai, the school curriculum also works to instill students with a particular work ethic 
laced with nationalistic undertones.313 Lessons are designed not only to motivate students 
to take their studies seriously but also to work to build a greater Indonesian nation, citing 
the deeds of national leaders such as Ahmad Dahlan, General Sudirman, President Suharto, 
and political activist Hamka, among others, as examples to emulate.314 Additionally, 
Indonesian Islamic scholars Sutarman, Heru Tjahjono, and Tasman Hamami, report that 
the schools enforce a daily culture of friendliness and politeness by encouraging smiling 
and greeting fellow students, teachers, and staff, in an effort to develop empathy, self-
regulation, and social skills.315 The schools also seek to instill conscientiousness and social 
responsibility, such as environmental stewardship, with activities that include cleaning up 
natural areas and plastic-free days in school.316 
The Muhammadiyah curriculum includes both religious and general subjects and, 
according to Daulai, the schools expect students to become masters in both types of 
knowledge.317 Education expert Charlene Tan reports that the Muhammadiyah curriculum 
teaches seventy percent general education topics and thirty percent religious lessons, which 
certifies the schools as equivalent to public schools for students seeking admission into 
university programs.318 Muhammadiyah’s general education curriculum mirrors the 
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national curriculum established by the Ministries of Education and Religious Affairs, 
which includes mathematics, physical and social sciences, history, and lessons on the value 
of Indonesian democracy and Pancasila in particular.319 Its religious curriculum focuses on 
Qur’anic lessons, Islamic history, and core Muhammadiyah beliefs, such as the need to 
purify tawhid, and to reject traditional superstitions and any form of heresy, generally 
defined as any act not based in the Qur’an or Sunna.320  
According to Sutarman, Tjahjono, and Hamami, the typical school day starts at 
three o’clock in the morning with group prayers, after which the students participate in 
physical activities, such as sports, until breakfast.321 Academic lessons generally occur 
from seven o’clock until three o’clock in the afternoon, with lunch and prayer breaks 
dispersed throughout the day.322 After class, students participate in extracurricular 
activities or perform community service until seven o’clock in the evening, at which time 
they perform prayers, eat supper, and return home to study and rest until morning.323 To 
compete with government schools, Muhammadiyah schools also offer modern educational 
facilities—complete with computer labs, sports centers, and libraries—and incorporate 
standard grades of education from elementary to high school, with structured assessments 
at each level.324  
Tan notes that the schools focus on “active learning” by placing the teacher in a 
facilitating role to allow students to “discuss, cooperate, experiment, inquire, and explore” 
throughout each learning experience.325 This form of self-directed learning, Tan argues, 
goes beyond rote memorization to encourage students to draw their own conclusions and 
develop evidence-based justifications for their arguments.326 Florian Pohl, Associate 
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Professor in Religion at Emory University, also describes the schools’ instructional 
methodology as one aimed at participatory learning and critical thinking.327 According to 
Pohl, course materials also address contemporary social issues including democracy, 
tolerance, and human rights using Islamic principles as a reference point for discussions.328 
Tan reports that these schools follow Dahlan’s founding vision to reconcile modern 
“Western” science, educational practices, and technologies with Islamic dogma.329 They 
reject the opinion that “modern” education is “Western” education, arguing instead that all 
knowledge comes from God.330 Also, the schools argue that modern Western 
intellectualism is predominantly based on medieval Europe’s adoption of early Muslim 
advances in science and thought. Therefore, it is not anathema to the Islamic way of life.331 
To reinforce this connection, teachers link secular subjects to relevant Islamic history and 
teachings in the Qur’an, hadith, and Sunna.332 For instance, according to Islamic scholar 
Agus Miswanto, Muhammadiyah textbooks point out that the basic tenets of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights are virtually identical to the five basic principles of Maqashid 
al-Shariah, which are the protection of religious freedom and belief; right to protection of 
life; protection of reproduction and child rights; protection of freedom of thought and 
expression; and rights to property and work.333 Tan also states that these schools attempt 
to instill religious values indirectly, such as by displaying religious lessons in high-
visibility areas throughout the school.334 
Tan reports that some schools still face difficulties integrating secular and religious 
concepts, mainly due to some teachers’ inability to properly recognize and connect relevant 
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Qur’anic verses to secular lessons.335 Tan concludes that this challenge has resulted in 
“educational dualism” in some schools, where lessons seem to come from two separate 
curricula—one religious and one secular—with little connection between the two.336 
Somewhat similarly, Menchik states that Muhammadiyah schools in areas that have large 
Christian or Buddhist populations limit drawing connections between secular and religious 
topics, albeit deliberately.337 In these schools, teachers of any faith can instruct students of 
any faith in secular subjects, but religious topics are instructed by members of the 
corresponding religion.338 While this method contributes to the separation of secular and 
religious instruction, Menchik argues that it also promotes mutual respect and cooperation 
between members of different religions.339 
Muhammadiyah schools also make an effort to respect the local cultural traditions 
of the communities in which they operate. Van Bruinessen states that most Muhammadiyah 
schools teach little to no Arabic, especially in the lower grades, and instead rely on 
contemporary Indonesian translations of religious texts.340 Islamic scholar Ahmad Burhani 
states that the reason for using the vernacular is not only to make the content more 
accessible, but also to reinforce the school’s nationalist philosophy.341 According to 
Burhani, language acts as a powerful method of separating locals from foreign influences 
and places them into a distinct national community unified by a shared language.342 In 
addition to using local languages and dialects during lessons, Woodward states that the 
schools encourage students to wear traditional Indonesian clothing and, especially, modern 
Western clothing styles.343 The schools also participate in Takbir Keliling, a major 
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Indonesian holiday celebrating the end of Ramadan, by having students spend a month 
constructing elaborate floats and decorations to carry around the city during the event.344 
According to Daulai, the schools also sponsor the Muhammadiyah Student 
Association (IPM), which all students are required to join.345 The association hosts 
activities for both students and the local community that focus mainly on teaching religious 
subjects, such as training in Qur’anic reading and sermonizing, and organizing Ramadan 
trips to various Muhammadiyah-sponsored mosques around the country.346 Other activities 
outside the school include a youth scouting organization called Hizbul Wathan (HW) 
Scouts, various martial arts groups, summer camps, sports teams, art groups, and drum 
bands.347 The school system considers these social functions critical for instilling a 
charitable mindset among students that will, in turn, protect them from immoral or impolite 
behavior at home, in the school, and in the community.348 Daulai further points out that 
Muhammadiyah also expects their students to represent and promote the organization and 
its values within society after graduation, essentially acting as informal ambassadors and 
recruiters for the organization.349 
Political scientist Robin Bush, drawing from a national survey conducted in 2014 
by the Asia Institute and Lingkaran Studi Indonesia, argues that the Muhammadiyah 
schools have had some success in instilling their values within student populations. In 
views relating to democracy and gender relations, for instance, eighty-nine percent of 
Muhammadiyah alumni respondents strongly believe that democracy is the best form of 
government, and eighty-two percent stated that wives have the right to earn income for the 
family and have a say in family financial decisions.350 Additionally, concerning religious 
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tolerance, seventy percent of respondents indicated tolerance towards non-Muslims 
moving into their communities and more than eighty percent accepted non-Muslims 
becoming teachers in national schools.351 
Several scholars contend that the Muhammadiyah schools have made a broad 
impact on Indonesian society over the last century. Daulai states that Muhammadiyah’s 
robust alumni network extends into almost all areas of the government and throughout civil 
society in the country.352 She argues that Muhammadiyah members have participated in 
drafting government legislation on numerous topics, including the development of the 
national curriculum, which, over time, has led to a partial confluence in the content of the 
national public school curriculum and the Muhammadiyah curriculum.353 Education 
experts Imron Wakhid Harits, Stefan Chudy, Alena Juvova, and Pavla Andrysova argue 
that Muhammadiyah has played a major role in reforming general Indonesian thoughts on 
the value of education. They state that the organization continues to reflect Dahlan’s 
support for universal education, which draws from the educational philosophy of 
Enlightenment scholar John Amos Comenius.354 Comenius and Dahlan both considered 
education a basic human right for all citizens regardless of religion, socio-economic status, 
or gender.355 Harits et al. conclude that Muhammadiyah’s efforts to provide quality 
education for historically marginalized communities have helped spread support for the 
concept of education as a right throughout Indonesia.356  
According to political scientists Wendy Wirawan and Adhikatama, 
Muhammadiyah’s support for the government and promotion of Pancasila has even helped 
block radical ideologies from taking hold in Indonesian society.357 Wirawan and 
Adhikatama state that Muhammadiyah has successfully cultivated trust in the state and 
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dedication to common national identity within Indonesian citizens based on the principles 
of Pancasila.358 They further argue that this unified support for Pancasila and the 
Indonesian state has inoculated the population somewhat from contradicting values, 
particularly violent anti-state dogmas such as those espoused by the Indonesian branch of 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).359  
Menchik argues that Muhammadiyah’s advocacy for religious pluralism has 
contributed to the development of what he terms “godly nationalism” in Indonesia, where 
otherwise conflicting religious movements come together in cooperation with the state 
based on their shared belief in God, without being particular about which path each should 
choose.360 Menchik argues that this form of nationalism has created a communal identity 
in Indonesia that is tolerant of religious diversity, although not of heterodox movements 
that seek religious homogeneity or threaten to destabilize the political system.361 He further 
argues that widespread adoption of this concept is also partially responsible for the 
difficulty many Islamist movements have had in attempting to establish a foothold in 
Indonesia.362 
C. SOCIALIZATION ANALYSIS OF MUHAMMADIYAH 
This section uses the analytical framework proposed in Chapter II to evaluate how 
the Muhammadiyah schools incorporate the principles of socialization theory—or the 
process of indoctrinating individuals to social norms and standards of the group—when 
constructing their curriculum goals. According to Hadden and Long, the most important 
attribute that these socializing agents produce within new members is a sense of 
commitment, or the faithful realization of the principles of the group in all actions of its 
members and their willingness to be held accountable in doing so.363 This theory is 
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significant for studying the Muhammadiyah school system in Indonesia because it explains 
how children are raised to become dedicated members of an institution that supports 
democratic governance, tolerance, and social justice. The framework draws on Long’s and 
Hadden’s five criteria—showing (demonstrating the values of the group), shaping 
(reinforcing commitment to those social values), recruiting (identifying and attracting new 
members), certifying (validating commitment to group values), and placing (incorporating 
members into the group)—to help identify and analyze specific socializing aspects of the 
Muhammadiyah school system described above. 
The Muhammadiyah schools display a strong showing activity in promoting their 
values of modernism, nationalism, and tolerance, but have a slightly reduced showing 
activity for their religious values. The school curriculum regularly infuses lessons with 
stories of national heroes who were either Muhammadiyah members or espoused ideals 
similar to Muhammadiyah, to reinforce their nationalist narrative and show 
Muhammadiyah values as congruent with those of the nation. The schools show their 
religious values by linking secular subjects to Qur’anic verses and lessons in the Hadith 
and Sunna. The schools also indirectly show these values by placing décor with religious 
teachings throughout the school. Muhammadiyah’s showing activity for its religious ideals 
seems somewhat diluted by the organization’s inclusion of conflicting traditional practices, 
such as visiting grave sites, praying for the dead, and the Takbir Keliling celebration, yet 
these activities simultaneously show how Muhammadiyah demonstrates tolerance for 
differing viewpoints. This activity is also limited in schools with teachers that have 
difficulties properly integrating Islamic and secular topics. Similarly, by adjusting the 
teachers and curriculum to suit the socio-religious backgrounds of different student 
populations in certain areas, the schools necessarily limit showing Muhammadiyah’s 
religious ideology to promote the values of mutual respect and cooperation between 
religions.   
The shaping activity is particularly strong within Muhammadiyah schools. Lessons 
are designed to challenge students to work hard in school and, later, to apply that work 
ethic toward improving the country. Teachers encourage students to smile and give daily 
greetings to habituate good social skills, empathy, and self-regulation. The schools apply 
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“active learning” to engage students and assist them in internalizing the lessons and their 
underlying values, which empowers them to be able to make and defend arguments in 
support of these concepts. The schools also teach mostly in the vernacular to make content 
more accessible and unify the student body through a shared language. Furthermore, the 
schools incorporate class activities that support the organization’s values, such as 
environmental cleanup events, community service activities, plastic-free days, and 
preparations for annual Takbir Keliling celebrations. Students are expected to participate 
in daily prayers and religious lessons, IPM student association activities, group physical 
training exercises, and extra-curricular activities like the HW Scouts, martial arts groups, 
sports teams, art groups, and drum bands. These activities are popular among students but 
also instill Muhammadiyah philosophies on morality, charity, and social responsibility.  
The recruiting activity occurs within the Muhammadiyah schools by attracting new 
students, increasing membership in the national organization, and garnering popular 
support for the movement. The schools attract students by providing modern educational 
facilities and a curriculum structure similar to Indonesian public schools, which includes a 
significant proportion of secular subjects. More importantly, however, the schools recruit 
based on Dahlan’s founding principle of providing quality modern education while 
upholding Islamic values to create a “real Islamic society” in touch with the modern world. 
They recruit in local communities through their outreach activities and community service 
efforts, as well as by requiring graduating students to act as informal ambassadors and 
recruiters both for the schools themselves and the larger Muhammadiyah movement in 
Indonesia. Recruiting for the overarching Muhammadiyah organization also occurs in the 
schools by enforcing membership in the IPM student association and by exposing students 
to Muhammadiyah alumni, Muhammadiyah-aligned mosques, and other social institutions 
run by the organization. Muhammadiyah also plans to expand its outreach beyond 
Indonesia, particularly into Australia, to offer study abroad opportunities for Indonesian 
Muslim students and attract Australian Muslims looking for the type of Islamic education 
that Muhammadiyah provides. 
The Muhammadiyah schools also offer a strong certifying activity in their 
curriculum through both formal and informal means. Like the critical thinking CVE 
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educational programs described in Chapter III, the Muhammadiyah schools use the active 
learning model to certify their students’ ability to analyze and support arguments critically. 
Unlike the critical thinking CVE programs that avoid instilling any single values system, 
the Muhammadiyah schools link these cognitive skills with the institution’s social values 
as a means of strengthening the students’ confidence in articulating and defending those 
beliefs. Similar to the Salafi schools described in Chapter IV, Muhammadiyah teachers test 
students at the end of each grade on both secular and religious knowledge and monitor 
student behavior throughout the school day to ensure they act in accordance with the social 
standards set by the school. In addition, requiring students to act as informal ambassadors 
and to take part in student association activities, HW Scouts and other extracurricular 
activities contribute to instilling confidence in living the organization’s values outside the 
classroom. It also seems likely that the students’ frequent interactions with the country’s 
large alumni community through these types of activities help to instill social confidence 
among older Muhammadiyah members to accept and integrate new graduates due to these 
existing relationships. 
Placing also features strongly within the Muhammadiyah schools. The schools 
prepare students to apply to college, especially to one of Muhammadiyah’s universities, 
and to find jobs by leveraging connections within the organization’s massive alumni 
community of over 30 million members. The integration of Muhammadiyah members into 
most government departments, civil institutions, and many private businesses throughout 
the country also assists with placing new members into a cohesive community after 
graduation. More broadly, the schools help students become productive members of 
Indonesian society by enforcing community service and social outreach activities and 
inducing support for religious pluralism, tolerance, service, nationalism and Indonesia’s 
core values.  
Overall, the Muhammadiyah school system acts as a strong socializing agent by 
performing all five of the socializing activities described by Hadden and Long. Table 4 
summarizes the five socializing activities of the Muhammadiyah schools in Indonesia. 
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Table 4.   Analysis of Muhammadiyah School Socializing Activities 
Socializing Activity Description of Activity within Muhammadiyah Schools 
Showing 
Strong nationalist and tolerant values using historical examples, 
incorporating local practices, and including members from 
different religions. Religious values mixed into secular lessons 
and shown in the environment, but limited in favor of tolerance. 
Shaping 
Strong habituation of social behaviors, community service 
mindset, and work ethic in class. Empowers students to 
internalize and defend viewpoints. Reinforces values through 
organizations, group activities, and a shared language. 
Recruiting 
Strong recruiting for schools and larger organization through 
community outreach, mosques, alumni, and competitive 
program. Involves students in recruiting efforts through student 
association and after graduation as informal ambassadors. 
Certifying 
Strong formal and informal testing of ideological knowledge, 
behaviors, and social confidence using active learning model. 
Builds confidence among students and community through 
extracurricular activities and exposure to alumni. 
Placing 
Strong social connection to local communities and members of 
the larger Muhammadiyah movement, and informally places 
students into Indonesian society through social outreach, 
community service, and support for Indonesian nationalism. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter described the history, development, and activities of the 
Muhammadiyah school system in Indonesia. It identified the background and mission of 
Muhammadiyah movement, the values and norms propagated through the schools’ 
curricula, and the effects of their social outreach activities in local communities and 
broader Indonesian society. Finally, this chapter analyzed the socializing elements of the 
Muhammadiyah school system and found that it performs all five activities of showing, 
shaping, recruiting, certifying, and placing to instill a commitment to certain values within 
the student body, including religious pluralism, tolerance, community service, and a 
particular brand of Indonesian nationalism. The socializing activities conducted in 
Muhammadiyah schools have helped increase popular support for universal education, 
democracy, the Indonesian government and its political philosophy of Pancasila, as well as 
84 
bolster tolerance for traditional Indonesian customs and differing religious beliefs. Finally, 
these schools have contributed to the immunization of parts of Indonesian society against 
the encroachment of anti-establishment and violent extremist ideologies in the country. 
The next chapter studies the Beyond Bali Education Program, which aims to instill 
certain traits in students that enable them to identify, analyze, and reject violent extremist 
ideologies. An analysis of the socializing functions of Beyond Bali will identify which 
characteristics of the program commit students to the program’s values and objectives. 
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VI. CASE STUDY: BEYOND BALI EDUCATION PROGRAM 
The previous chapters investigated the socializing activities of two established 
educational institutions in Indonesia: Salafi schools and Muhammadiyah schools. Both of 
these organizations offer a complete learning experience for students from elementary 
school through high school, to include extracurricular activities and community outreach 
events. Unlike these two complete school systems, many Western CVE education 
programs are supplemental packages designed to complement existing school curricula. As 
described in Chapter III, most CVE education programs fall into one or more of four broad 
approaches: teaching vocational skills, developing critical thinking skills, increasing 
exposure to diversity, and reforming religious education. Each approach addresses specific 
factors that potentially lead to radicalization in an effort to reduce future incidences of 
violence or support for extremist organizations. Many of these approaches are either short-
duration training programs or individual lessons designed for use in existing schools. 
This chapter examines one example of a Western CVE program—the Beyond Bali 
Education Program. Curtin University in Australia, together with the Bali Peace Park 
Association and the Australian government, developed Beyond Bali following the 2002 
bombings in Bali, Indonesia, that killed more than 200 people, including eighty-eight 
Australian tourists.364 The program package comprises a five-module curriculum that 
focuses on critical thinking, exposure to diversity, and non-violent conflict resolution and 
is designed to integrate into both secular and Islamic schools in Australia. The chapter 
begins by describing the background and development of the Beyond Bali Education 
Program. It then outlines its purpose, curriculum, and preliminary results of the program’s 
execution in one secular school and in one Islamic school in Australia. Finally, the chapter 
analyzes the socializing activities of Beyond Bali using the analytical framework from 
Chapter II to determine how the program commits students to values inimical to violent 
extremism. It draws from primary program materials, including teacher instructions, lesson 
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outlines, activity sheets, videos, and student workbooks, and reports from Beyond Bali 
program developers Anne Aly, Elizabeth Taylor, Saul Karnovsky concerning the 
development and execution of the program, as well as other independent analyses of the 
program.  
The chapter finds that the program displays both strong and weak characteristics as 
a socializing agent. Beyond Bali avoids socializing a particular set of communal values by 
instead focusing on promoting critical thinking and exposure to diversity to inoculate 
against violent extremist ideologies. Nonetheless, because the program combines multiple 
CVE approaches and incorporates the communal activity of building a peace park it is able 
to perform more socializing activities than if it utilized only one approach. 
A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF BEYOND BALI 
In October 2002, two bombs detonated at the Sari Club near Kuta beach in Bali, 
Indonesia, killing more than 200 people. A South Asian terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah, 
planned and conducted the attack, and included operatives from both Indonesia and 
Malaysia, as well as support from Al Qaeda. The attack, which took everyone by surprise, 
raised concerns across the region for how best to prevent such operations in the future.365 
Following the bombings, professors at Curtin University in Western Australia and the Bali 
Peace Park Association Incorporated (BPPAI), an Indonesian non-profit organization 
working to build a peace park on the site of the 2002 bombings, began work on a CVE 
education program for inclusion into existing schools.366 The Australian Federal Attorney 
General’s Department funded the project as part of its Building Community Resilience 
Program.367 The resulting package, called the Beyond Bali Education Program, is a 
counter-violent extremism education package designed to prevent Australian secondary 
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school students in educational years eight and nine—approximately ages thirteen to 
fifteen—from adopting violent extremist ideologies.368  
The Beyond Bali project team, led by Aly, consisted of Curtin University educators, 
local school teachers, representatives from BPPAI, counter-terrorism experts, Bali 
Bombing victims, and a Muslim youth representative. Together they developed the 
program’s concept and materials in accordance with the Australian Curriculum 
Framework, Australia’s national educational criteria managed by the Australian 
Curriculum, Assessment, and Reporting Authority.369 The team designed the package for 
inclusion in both secular and Islamic schools throughout Australia. Aly reports that, as of 
2018, the program has been implemented in approximately 400 schools across Australia—
although she did not note the total number of Islamic schools that have adopted the 
program—and the creators have made the entire program package available to download 
free of charge on the Bali Peace Park website.370 
Similar to the CVE education approaches defined in Chapter III, the Beyond Bali 
Education Program bases its CVE effort within moral disengagement theory, the concept 
that otherwise moral people commit violent acts in violation of their moral standards.371 
Developed by psychologist Albert Bandura, the theory describes moral disengagement as 
a psychological process that degrades one’s self-sanctioning mechanisms by construing 
violent extremism as morally just, dehumanizing the victims, absolving attackers of blame, 
and disregarding the consequences of their actions.372 
Beyond Bali seeks to prevent violent extremism by teaching students cognitive self-
sanctioning skills that help them adhere to their moral code and reject violent extremist 
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narratives.373 The program blends aspects of the critical thinking and exposure to diversity 
approaches described in Chapter III as foundations for its CVE methodology. Specifically, 
according to its published learning outcomes, the program aims to cultivate within students 
the cognitive skills to critically analyze violent extremism, along with its causes and social 
consequences from multiple points of view.374 By the end of the program, students should 
develop empathy for victims of terrorism, contemplate the negative effects of violent 
extremism, increase self-efficacy as it relates to self-sanctioning, and, ultimately, conclude 
that violent extremism is unjust and incompatible with the students’ preexisting moral 
values.375 
B. THE BEYOND BALI CURRICULUM 
To accomplish the program’s stated goals, the Beyond Bali curriculum targets the 
mechanisms for moral disengagement and facilitates critical thought by analyzing moral 
dilemma stories related to the Bali bombings.376 The program’s use of moral dilemmas 
comes from psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg’s cognitive theory of moral development, 
which contends that analyzing moral dilemmas can enable students to explore, critically 
assess, and discuss their moral beliefs with their peers, leading to a reconstruction of 
assumptions and perspectives that furthers their moral learning.377 The program also offers 
the Bali Peace Park as a concrete example of a productive communal response to violent 
extremism and encourages students to think about other individual and collective methods 
to resist extremism.378 In addition to learning the CVE content, students are expected to 
develop skills in reading, note-taking, research, and analysis during the course.379 
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Aly and her team developed five modules designed to expose students to multiple 
points of view surrounding the implications of terrorism and offer non-violent approaches 
to problem-solving.380 According to Aly, the modules guide students “through five stages 
of engagement, empathy, moral reasoning and mindfulness, problem-solving, and creative 
resolution using the context of the Bali bombings and the Bali peace park.”381 Module 1 
introduces students to the program and generates interest in the subject through trivia 
games, photos and videos, and group activities that reveal the religious, cultural, and 
historical importance of both Indonesia and Australia.382 Additionally, students complete 
reading and group research activities on Australian history, early Australian contact with 
Indonesia, and aspects of Hinduism and Islam in both countries to evaluate the significance 
of Australia’s role in the Asian-Pacific region, which forms the context in which they will 
study the Bali bombings themselves.383  
Module 2 exposes students to details of the 2002 Bali bombings to explicate the 
consequences of extremist violence and to build empathy for the victims.384 News reports, 
video interviews with Australian and Indonesian survivors, and statistics regarding Bali’s 
tourism trends before and after the bombings present the social and economic impact of 
the terrorist attacks on Indonesia and Australia.385 Several activities ask students to 
identify, react to, and discuss their feelings and the feelings of the victims and their families 
in response to the bombings to build empathy and understanding of the consequences of 
violent action.386 The module also explores the concepts of peace and conflict through 
workbooks and group activities designed to discuss how violence creates division and 
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conflict, while peaceful conflict resolution promotes unity and resilience against that 
conflict.387 According to Aly, this module forces students to think about their own moral 
values and requires the use of moral reasoning and critical thinking to analyze the Bali 
bombings and their aftermath in the context of their moral beliefs.388  
Module 3 contains the central learning outcomes for the program. It incorporates 
moral dilemma scenarios intended to promote critical thinking and collaborative decision-
making at different stages of the story, with a focus more on personal reflection and 
confrontation with competing values rather than on moral reasoning.389 The moral 
dilemmas revolve around the concepts of violence and revenge by comparing the decisions 
and values of the bomber, an Australian survivor and his wife, and a Balinese citizen. 
Students are asked to identify the feelings and justifications for each character’s actions, 
and how they would approach the dilemma if they were in the same situation.390 The 
teacher then leads the class through a discussion of their findings to draw conclusions 
regarding the use of violence in achieving one’s goals, from the points of view of both 
terrorism and counterterrorism.391 Aly asserts that, in this module, students should be able 
to articulate their moral views and demonstrate increased self-efficacy in responding to 
extremism and self-sanctioning against violence.392  
Module 4 outlines how various peace parks and peace activism work to promote 
peaceful resolutions to conflict and violent extremism.393 Students are introduced to the 
idea of a peace park as a safe place for people to memorialize and reflect on a past conflict, 
resolve conflicts, and build relationships, and how they act as a mechanism for 
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communities to reject violence and bullying.394 Students then conduct research into various 
peace parks and share their findings with the class. This module aims to reflect the 
Australian Curriculum Framework objectives of building information and communication 
technology capability and promoting social awareness and responsibility.395 
Module 5 closes with a review of the program and a practical exercise during which 
the students are encouraged to work with their school, parents, and the local community to 
build their own peace park or garden.396 This activity is meant to provide the students with 
an opportunity to act and engages the students in carrying out a practical exercise in peace-
building and self-sanctioning against violent extremism.397 
In total, the five-module program is designed to integrate into existing school 
curricula as a thirty-hour elective learning package, and each activity within it is built to 
adhere to the learning outcomes directed by the Australian Curriculum Framework.398 
Module 1 fulfills the Australian Curriculum Framework objectives of promoting 
collaboration and teamwork, an appreciation for Australia’s social and cultural diversity, 
critical thinking, literacy, and intercultural understanding.399 The Module 2 and 3 goals 
intend to match the Australian Curriculum Framework objectives of literacy and fluency 
in learning technology, critical thinking, ethical behavior, and cross-cultural 
communication.400 Module 4 links to the objectives of social awareness, logical reasoning, 
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“Beyond Bali Education Kit Module 1 & 2,” 1–7. 
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social management and responsibility through cooperation, and inter-cultural 
understanding.401 Module 5 also links to critical thinking and ethical decision-making and 
adds links to Framework objectives regarding active citizenship and commitment to 
democracy, equity, and justice.402 
Despite its links to the Australian Curriculum Framework, the program has faced 
some difficulties integrating into schools. In their analysis of the program, Ali, Taylor, and 
Karnovsky expressed hope that linking the lessons to the Australian Curriculum 
Framework would make the modules acceptable to secondary school teachers expected to 
give the lessons, but they found evidence to suggest that some elements of the program 
failed to match the priorities and goals of local school teachers.403 For instance, the project 
team piloted the program in 2012 at two schools in Perth: a government secondary school 
and a private Islamic secondary school.404 The team administered questionnaires and 
conducted focus groups with the teachers and students to test the program’s effectiveness 
in promoting moral engagement, the usability of the program package, student interest and 
engagement, and relevance of the program as part of the school curriculum.405 Aly argues 
that the students and teachers successfully engaged with the program because it aligned 
with the national curriculum, rather than being a stand-alone course.406  
According to the results of the program trial, however, the teachers at the public 
school adapted the program to fit into the political science and philosophy classes they 
were teaching, and the teachers at the Islamic school reported that they made undisclosed 
changes to the materials but gave no other feedback on the program.407 During interviews 
with the students, the evaluation team discovered that, because the teachers changed or 
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omitted activities, several important aspects of the program were lost, resulting in an 
overall reduction in the program’s impact.408 
Finally, the research conducted on this program failed to find evidence of additional 
schools adopting the program after it was made available online or analysis of the 
program’s effectiveness within Australia. Determining the program’s success in the 
selected schools or its overall effect in preventing violent extremism within the Australian 
community is therefore not possible. Research done by the Australian Counter Terrorism 
and Security Technology Centre, outlined in Chapter III, notes that this lack of data 
collection and analysis is typical of Western CVE educational programs. Notably, Aly 
received a grant to conduct a longitudinal study of the program starting in 2012, and her 
analysis is currently ongoing.409 Perhaps the results of this and other future evaluative 
efforts will shed light on the overall efficacy of this program in preventing violent 
extremism in Australia and whether or not the program might be useful in other countries, 
specifically Muslim-majority countries like Indonesia. 
C. SOCIALIZATION ANALYSIS OF BEYOND BALI 
This section uses the analytical framework proposed in Chapter II to evaluate how 
the Beyond Bali Education Program incorporates the principles of socialization theory—
the process of indoctrinating individuals to social norms and standards of the group—when 
constructing its curriculum goals. According to Hadden and Long, the most important 
attribute that these socializing agents produce within new members is a sense of 
commitment, or the faithful realization of the principles of the group in all actions of its 
members and their willingness to be held accountable in doing so.410 This theory is 
significant for studying the Beyond Bali program because it explains how children are 
ingrained with cognitive and ethical skills that reinforce communal standards of moral 
behavior, non-violence and conflict resolution. The framework draws on Long’s and 
Hadden’s five criteria—showing (demonstrating the values of the group), shaping 
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(reinforcing commitment to those social values), recruiting (identifying and attracting new 
members), certifying (validating commitment to group values), and placing (incorporating 
members into the group)—to help identify and analyze specific socializing aspects of the 
Beyond Bali program described above. 
The Beyond Bali program offers a strong showing activity by combining aspects of 
the critical thinking CVE approach and exposure to diversity approach described in 
Chapter III. The program promotes consideration for diverse points of view, empathy, 
critical thinking, autonomy, and non-violent conflict resolution by leading students through 
a study of the Bali bombings using the experiences of both the victims and perpetrators of 
the attacks, and by exposing them the diverse views of fellow students regarding morality, 
violence, and conflict resolution. The program also shows the concept of a peace park as a 
concrete non-violent communal response to violent extremism and encourages students to 
consider how they can develop similar interventions in their community. 
Nonetheless, the showing activity in Beyond Bali displays limitations similar to 
other critical thinking and exposure to diversity CVE programs. Beyond Bali addresses 
what the creators identify as a major source of violent extremism—moral disengagement—
by condemning violence as a means of addressing grievances but refrains from promoting 
any one specific set of moral values. Aly states that “moral standards are adopted through 
the course of socialization and serve as guiding principles for moral conduct,” yet she does 
not state from where those morals come or what they should be.411 Interestingly, the 
Module 3 instructions for teachers support teaching moral values in schools but 
simultaneously condemn teaching any specific set of values to the students.412 The program 
instead advocates only to offer “opportunities for students to construct values themselves” 
and in doing so provide “the basis for values learning without the danger of 
indoctrination.”413 It seems reasonable to conclude, however, that the act of exposing 
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students to the content of the program and the views of other students who already espouse 
the desired moral values shows these ideals to some extent. 
As with the showing activity, Beyond Bali displays the shaping activity in some 
modules to reinforce certain skills but, in general, avoids habituating commitment to a 
specific set of communal values. Examples of shaping within the program include 
conducting role-playing activities in Modules 2 and 3 and building a peace park in Module 
5 to reinforce understanding, critical thinking, and non-violent conflict resolution. Similar 
to the critical thinking and exposure to diversity CVE education programs in Chapter III, 
though, Beyond Bali refrains from reinforcing the community’s accepted standard of moral 
behavior. Political scientist Sarah Marsden argues in her analysis of the program that this 
outlook undermines the purpose and effectiveness of the program by assuming students are 
already committed to the correct normative values. According to Marsden, there is no 
guarantee that students will adopt the correct values: a student might determine by the end 
of the class that his or her beliefs regarding the permissibility of the use of violence in 
certain circumstances are correct.414 For example, Marsden claims that many individuals 
who engage in extremist violence generally believe their actions are moral and virtuous, so 
they knowingly break from the social norm of non-violence as an act of service and self-
sacrifice to accomplish some “greater good through violence.”415 She further concludes 
that, while the Beyond Bali program shows the dominant Australian norms regarding 
violence, it falls short of actually committing the students to those norms.416 
Recruiting for the program is understandably lacking due to the fact that students 
automatically participate in Beyond Bali if their school has incorporated it into the 
curriculum, but some recruiting activities within the community do occur. For example, 
Module 5 of the Beyond Bali curriculum helps recruit parents and members of the local 
community to assist students with building their own peace park or garden, which increases 
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exposure for the program and its ideals beyond the classroom. Despite these activities 
within the program, recruiting for follow-on social groups is weak because Beyond Bali 
does not formally connect students to organizations outside of school, even to the BPPAI, 
nor does it offer follow-on activities or resources for students after graduation. 
Certifying also appears in this program, primarily at the individual level, and relates 
to a cognitive skill rather than building social confidence within the students and between 
them and members of the community. Characteristic of the critical thinking approach, 
Beyond Bali validates the students’ ability to apply critical thinking skills to problems and 
seeks to develop confidence within students to investigate and challenge opposing 
viewpoints in their communities. Critical to socialization theory, however, it does not seek 
to build a shared set of values within the students or help them better integrate into 
Australian society. This lack of social confidence is particularly important within the 
Islamic schools that administer the Beyond Bali program as they represent a minority group 
in the country.  
As with recruiting, the placing activity within Beyond Bali is somewhat lacking. 
Placing is accomplished to some extent in Module 5, which creates a gateway to nonviolent 
activism by involving students in the community by planning a peace park of their own, 
and, informally, students have the opportunity to continue working towards building and 
expanding peace parks within the community after graduation if they so choose. The 
program’s limited integration into the community and lack of connections to follow-on 
organizations ultimately reduces the program’s ability to place students into suitable social 
structures upon completion of the program. 
Overall, Beyond Bali displays both strong and weak characteristics as a socializing 




Table 5.   Analysis of Beyond Bali Socializing Activities 
Socializing Activity Description of Activity within Beyond Bali Program 
Showing 
Strong support for diverse points of view, empathy, critical 
thinking, autonomy, and non-violent conflict resolution. Offers 
concrete example through peace parks. Addresses moral 
disengagement but avoids showing a set of moral values. 
Shaping 
Strong habituation of individual autonomy skills with limited 
reinforcement of communal standards of behavior due to lack of 
showing activity regarding social values. Reinforces existing 
student values through role-playing and building a peace park.  
Recruiting 
Lacks formal recruiting activity for the program due to automatic 
participation as part of the school curriculum and displays 
limited connections to a community of interest or integration of 
students into a social structure after graduation. 
Certifying 
Strong formal validation of individual cognitive skills. Lacks 
development of social confidence between students and 
community regarding a shared set of values or integrating into 
society, especially in Islamic schools. 
Placing 
Present in Module 5 by involving students, parents, and 
community in building a peace park, but lacks formal 
connections to follow-on groups or social structures into which 
the students can be placed. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter described the background and development of the Beyond Bali 
Education Program, a CVE education initiative of Curtin University and the Bali Peace 
Park Association with support from the Australian government. It identified the purpose 
and objectives of the Beyond Bali program, defined the five modules of the curriculum, 
and outlined the preliminary results of the program’s execution in both secular and Islamic 
schools in Australia. Finally, the chapter analyzed the socializing activities of Beyond Bali 
and found that the program displays both strong and weak characteristics as a socializing 
agent. The curriculum, lessons, and materials are well-designed to meet the goals of the 
program and display strong showing, shaping, and certifying activities to build individual 
autonomy within students. Beyond Bali avoids socializing within the students a 
commitment to a particular set of communal values in favor of promoting cognitive skills 
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and exposure to diversity to inoculate against violent extremist ideologies. In this way, 
Beyond Bali is representative of the Western CVE approaches that focus on diversity and 
critical thinking to combat violent extremism. By combining these approaches and 
involving the community in building a peace park, the program exhibits a greater 
socializing ability than if it adhered to only one approach. A lack of published analyses of 
the program makes measuring its success in countering violent extremism difficult, 
although the program is relatively young and research into its effectiveness is ongoing. 
The next chapter compares the socializing activities of the Salafi schools, 
Muhammadiyah schools, and the Beyond Bali Education Program, draws overall 
conclusions from the thesis, gives recommendations for future CVE education programs, 
and suggests some areas for future research. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This thesis aimed to investigate how Western governments can use formal 
education to prevent violent extremist ideologies from taking hold in a community, 
particularly in Muslim-majority countries. While many CVE experts agree that education 
is a valuable tool in preventing extremism, exactly what skills, knowledge, and other 
aspects of education are most effective in countering violent extremism is still a matter of 
some debate. Consequently, this thesis asked the following question: what is the 
relationship between formal education and violent extremism? More specifically, under 
what conditions do formal education prevent or instigate violent extremism? How do 
variations in aspects of formal education—such as curriculum, chosen learning style, 
subjects, materials, and pedagogy—affect violent extremism prevention strategies? And to 
what extent do cultural factors facilitate or inhibit preventative education programs? 
Finally, how can the United States Government best use formal education programs to 
prevent violent extremism abroad?  
This thesis sought to answer these questions through a controlled case study 
comparison of three educational programs, including the Salafi school system in Indonesia, 
the Muhammadiyah School system, also in Indonesia, and the Beyond Bali Education 
Program in Australia. The thesis used socialization theory to explain how these programs 
have instilled “commitment,” or the faithful realization of the principles of the group in all 
actions of its members and their willingness to be held accountable in doing so, within their 
students. Specifically, this thesis applied a framework based on five socializing activities 
identified by sociologists Jeffrey Hadden and Theodore Long—showing (demonstrating 
the values of the group), shaping (reinforcing commitment to those social values), 
recruiting (identifying and attracting new members), certifying (validating commitment to 
group values), and placing (incorporating members into the group)—to help identify and 
analyze specific socializing aspects of the selected educational programs.  
The study began in Chapter II with a brief historical context of Western and Islamic 
views on the purpose of education and its use as a socializing agent. Critically, the chapter 
illustrated how the origins and history of education both in the West and in the Muslim 
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world play important roles in shaping modern-day views on how various countries use 
education to counter violent extremism. Building off of this overview, Chapter II defined 
socialization theory as the process in which individuals learn the social norms, morals, and 
skills necessary to operate as productive members of society, and described how education 
lends itself as a socializing agent. It then proposed a framework based on the five-activity 
socialization process developed by Long and Hadden to help analyze each case study. 
Chapter III surveyed four major Western approaches to counter-violent extremism 
education: critical thinking skills, exposure to diversity, religious education, and vocational 
training, as well as the current debate surrounding their effectiveness. It concluded with an 
analysis of the approaches using the framework from Chapter II to identify how they 
commit students to specific communal values that contribute to preventing violent 
extremism. The chapter found that the majority of the CVE approaches feature strong 
showing activities as part of their educational programs, but that most lack evidence of 
shaping, recruiting, certifying, or placing activities. While all four programs display at least 
two strong socializing activities, none displays all five, and each could benefit from further 
examination into how to better operate as socializing agents to prevent violent extremism. 
Chapter IV investigated the development and educational activities of the Salafi 
school system in Indonesia and how it has used social processes to spread this ultra-
conservative form of Islam. It began with a discussion on Salafism in Indonesia and various 
countries’ support of Salafi education, most notably Saudi Arabia. It then outlined the 
effects Salafi schools have had on Indonesian society, namely the increasing Arabization 
of the country. The chapter then described the specific ideology, methodology, curriculum, 
and outreach activities found in the Salafi school network. Finally, the chapter identified 
how the Salafi school network socializes commitment to specific communal values that 
advance its socio-religious objectives in Indonesia. It found that these Salafi schools act as 
strong socializing agents by performing all five socializing activities as outlined in the 
analytical framework. Although the schools suffer some limitations as socializing agents 
due to their adversarial tone and exclusivist mentality, they are able to socialize 
commitment to a closed community that refuses to operate within the secular political 
system, segregates itself from society, and antagonizes traditional establishments. 
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Chapter V examined the socializing properties of the Muhammadiyah educational 
institution in Indonesia, founded by Ahmad Dahlan in 1912. It outlined the organization’s 
history, ideology, development, and relationship with the Indonesian government and 
described the details of the Muhammadiyah school system itself, including its typical daily 
activities, curricula, materials, and lessons, as well as its “active learning” model and 
community service activities that help students internalize the underlying principles of the 
organization. It then described the effects these schools have had on their students and 
Indonesian society as a whole. The chapter concluded with an analysis of the socializing 
activities of the Muhammadiyah school system and found that these schools perform all 
five socializing activities to instill the values of modernism, nationalism, and tolerance 
within the student population.  
Chapter VI presented a case study of the Beyond Bali Education Program in 
Australia as a representative example of most current Western CVE education initiatives. 
The chapter described the background and development of the Beyond Bali Education 
Program, its purpose, and its five-module curriculum, then summarized the preliminary 
results of the program’s execution in one secular school and one Islamic school in 
Australia. Lastly, the chapter analyzed the socializing activities of Beyond Bali and found 
that the program displays both strong and weak characteristics as a socializing agent. This 
is mainly because Beyond Bali avoids socializing a particular set of communal values by 
instead focusing on promoting critical thinking and exposure to diversity to inoculate 
against violent extremist ideologies. Nonetheless, combining multiple CVE approaches 
and incorporating the communal activity of building a peace park enables the program to 
perform more socializing activities than if it had utilized only one approach. 
A. CASE STUDY COMPARISON 
A comparison of the Salafi schools, Muhammadiyah schools, and Beyond Bali 
Education Program reveals important similarities and differences in how these educational 
programs implement each of the five socializing activities of showing, shaping, recruiting, 
certifying, and placing, and how those activities contribute to furthering the programs’ 
objectives. All three educational programs offer a strong showing activity by promoting 
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the values and standards of behavior of their organizations. Both the Salafi schools and 
Muhammadiyah schools perform this by providing simple, highly-curated examples of 
individuals and activities that represent the organization’s values and provide a model for 
students to emulate in their daily lives. For example, Salafi schools provide a simple and 
unambiguous understanding of Islam linked to Arab religious authority and offer an 
idealized version of the Saudi social structure as the definitive example of pious Islamic 
living. The Muhammadiyah school curriculum regularly infuses lessons with religious 
passages and stories of national heroes who espoused similar ideals to promote the 
organization’s religious and nationalist narratives and show Muhammadiyah values as 
congruent with those of the nation. Similarly, Beyond Bali promotes its values through 
carefully selected stories of the 2002 Bali Bombings and by a peace park as a concrete non-
violent communal response to violent extremism. 
All three programs also display limitations in their showing activities. The Salafi 
schools’ exclusivist and adversarial mentality reduce their reach into the community. 
Muhammadiyah sacrifices showing some religious values in order to show the values of 
tolerance and inclusion with non-Muslims in their communities. Beyond Bali prioritizes 
individual autonomy over communal values and relies on other socializing agents to 
provide the moral basis from which students analyze violent extremist ideologies. These 
limitations may complicate efforts to commit students to program goals. 
The shaping activity serves as the fundamental activity that habituates the students’ 
commitment to the desired values and behaviors. Shaping features prominently in both the 
Salafi and Muhammadiyah curricula to reinforce adherence to the standards of the group. 
Students develop habits that adhere to the social and religious principles of the schools 
through their daily routine and classroom studies. Some examples beyond lesson content 
include learning and using specific languages, wearing distinctive clothing, participating 
in group events and extra-curricular activities, and conducting outreach into the 
community, all of which reinforce organizational values and help students internalize 
commitment to those values. Unlike the Salafi and Muhammadiyah schools, Beyond Bali 
only displays the shaping activity in some modules to reinforce cognitive skills, but 
generally refrains from habituating commitment to the community’s accepted standard of 
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moral behavior. This is problematic because, as political scientist Sarah Marsden argues, 
Beyond Bali assumes students are already committed to the correct normative values, but 
there is no guarantee that students have or will adopt values that support the program’s goal 
of resisting violent extremism.417 
Recruiting involves identifying and attracting new members to fill particular roles 
in the group. Both the Muhammadiyah schools and Salafi schools display strong recruiting 
activity by offering a combination of modern educational facilities, a curriculum structure 
similar to Indonesian public schools, and commitment to Islamic values to attract Muslim 
parents and their children. Recruiting also occurs within both school systems by enforcing 
membership in student groups and by exposing students to alumni, religious leaders, and 
other associations linked to the schools’ parent movements. Nevertheless, the Salafi 
schools suffer somewhat due to their exclusivist mentality and inflammatory rhetoric, 
which interferes with recruiting and forces the schools to spend time normalizing their 
presence in the community. While the Muhammadiyah schools offer the strongest 
recruiting activity by connecting directly to both the local community and the national 
Muhammadiyah organization, neither the Salafi schools nor Beyond Bali formally connect 
students to follow-on organizations after graduation. Finally, recruiting for Beyond Bali is 
lacking due to the fact that students automatically participate in the program, but the peace 
park project in Module 5 incorporates parents and members of the local community to 
increase exposure for the program and its ideals beyond the classroom.  
Certifying serves as a quality control measure to gauge the extent of one’s 
commitment to the values of the group and validates their level of social confidence as 
members of the group. Both the Muhammadiyah schools and Salafi schools offer a strong 
certifying activity in their curricula through both formal and informal means. Both school 
systems test students at the end of each grade and monitor student behavior throughout the 
day to ensure they act in accordance with the social standards set by the school. Certifying 
also appears in the Beyond Bali program but relates to validating cognitive skills rather 
than building social confidence within the students and between them and members of the 
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community. Although Beyond Bali and Muhammadiyah schools both certify their 
students’ ability to analyze and support arguments critically, the Beyond Bali program 
avoids instilling any single values system while the Muhammadiyah schools link these 
cognitive skills with the institution’s social values to strengthen the students’ confidence 
in those beliefs. 
Placing requires situating a new member within the group’s social order during and 
after the socialization process. Placing features strongly within the Muhammadiyah 
schools but appears somewhat lacking in Salafi schools and the Beyond Bali Education 
Program. The Muhammadiyah schools and Salafi schools both prepare students to apply 
to college, particularly universities that subscribe to the same values as their programs. 
Additionally, both school systems informally connect students to like-minded communities 
in Indonesia and, in the case of the Salafi schools, the Middle East. Muhammadiyah’s real 
placing strength, however, comes from leveraging a massive alumni community of over 30 
million members, many of whom hold positions in government ministries, civil 
institutions, and private businesses throughout the country. Conversely, the Salafi schools 
and Beyond Bali seem to have little connection to any specific organizations to which they 
can connect students after graduation, which may limit their ability to place students into 
suitable social structures upon completion of the program. 
Overall, the Salafi schools and Muhammadiyah schools display strong evidence for 
all five socializing activities while the Beyond Bali Education Program displays both 
strong and weak aspects of showing, shaping, and placing with limited evidence of 
recruiting and certifying activities. 
B. FINDINGS FOR BUILDING AND EVALUATING CVE PROGRAMS 
The thesis concludes with four broad findings for developing and evaluating CVE 
education programs:  
First, an evaluation tool is needed for CVE programs. Overall, this thesis finds that 
socialization theory provides a useful framework for analyzing the ability of educational 
institutions to effect widespread social change, including preventing violent extremist 
ideologies from taking hold within a community. The socialization model developed by 
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Hadden and Long is a useful tool for identifying and categorizing the activities of an 
educational program and how they impact its overall effectiveness. For instance, the 
success of both the Salafi schools and Muhammadiyah schools in Indonesia correlate with 
the strength of their socializing activities. Even though both systems share similar core 
religious beliefs, they each work towards conflicting national objectives and instill 
substantially different social values among Indonesian students. Nevertheless, both schools 
perform all five socializing activities and are able to socialize commitment to their values 
within students as well as influence Indonesian society in support of their organizational 
objectives. In contrast, no Western CVE educational program analyzed in this thesis 
performs all five socialization activities, which may explain, in part, why these programs 
have met with limited success. Therefore, this socialization framework may help experts 
expand the currently limited body of analytical research regarding the effectiveness of CVE 
education programs. 
Second, socialization takes time. In addition to the five socializing activities, time 
is an important factor that affects an educational program’s socializing capability. As the 
case studies illustrate, socializing widespread change through education requires a 
significant amount of time. It has taken the Salafi schools twenty-four years to reach their 
current level of influence within Indonesian socio-religious structures, and 
Muhammadiyah schools have attained their significant reach only after more than a century 
of educating Indonesian youth and promoting the organization’s values. These lengthy 
timelines stand in contrast to the short-term execution typical of many Western CVE 
education initiatives, including the Beyond Bali Education Program, which seeks to instill 
lasting commitment to non-violence and resistance to extremism through a single thirty-
hour sequence. Such a short-term outlook threatens to undermine the effectiveness of even 
the most robust CVE education programs, yet this mentality appears entrenched within 
contemporary CVE thought. For example, in September 2017, Eric Rosand, a former senior 
counterterrorism and CVE official in the U.S. State Department, identified the difficulty 
CVE programs face when “politicians demand results in the short term despite the longer-
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term nature of CVE efforts.”418 Interestingly, he then implored U.S. CVE practitioners to 
follow the lead of Australian and Canadian CVE programs, citing their large CVE budgets 
and programs “designed to run for one-to-four years” as examples to emulate.419 Based on 
the findings of this thesis, however, it seems unlikely that a four-year program will produce 
a lasting effect in a community when it fails to outlast even a single generation of students 
in a school. 
Third, money is not the only form of influence. Notably, the case studies indicate 
that the Salafi schools and Muhammadiyah schools have enjoyed far more support from 
their patrons than simply funding. These schools also received consistent ideological and 
organizational guidance over time to help define and accomplish their goals. Since their 
founding, the Salafi schools have received consistent support from Saudi Arabia in the 
form of textbooks, religious judgements—or fatwas—and guest instructors that espouse 
the desired socio-religious values. By providing this type of support, Saudi Arabia has been 
able to influence Salafi education by controlling and shaping the content of the instruction 
students receive. The general uniformity in curricula between schools in the 
Muhammadiyah system is due in part to the consistent ideological guidance from the parent 
Muhammadiyah organization. Furthermore, the school has cooperated with all of 
Indonesia’s governments, from the Dutch colonial authority in the early 1900s to both the 
Old and New Order regimes after Indonesian independence, and finally the modern 
Indonesian republic since 1998. 
The example of the Soviet schools in Chapter II also supports the above points. 
Starting in 1917, the Soviet Commissariat for Enlightenment spent nearly three decades 
reshaping the national school system to provide universal education aimed at instilling 
communist ideals while eradicating the concepts of social classes, the division of labor, 
and nationalism from the popular mind. According to historian Larry Holmes, the 
program’s success in instilling communist ideals and support for the Soviet system 
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amongst the population required cooperation from a range of stakeholders, most 
importantly the teachers themselves, and the application of vast resources, time, and 
attention to the endeavor.420 Most CVE education programs, on the other hand, seem to 
neglect the socializing function of education in favor of its technical utility. This is 
problematic because, as education experts Henry A. Giroux and Michael Hand warn, the 
contemporary focus within Western CVE education on abstract learning and cognitive 
development, instead of on socio-political content such as character development and 
citizenship education, risks detaching the programs from society and rendering them 
unable to act as agents of socio-cultural change. 
Fourth, size does not necessarily equal influence. The case studies also show that 
an educational program’s ability to exert influence over social structures at the national 
level is not necessarily dependent on the number of schools in the system. It is unsurprising 
that the Muhammadiyah system, which boasts more than 15,000 schools and 30 million 
members in all sectors of Indonesian society, has been able to exert significant influence 
in Indonesia. Conversely, a loose network of only fifty Salafi schools has managed to shift 
social, political, and religious discourse in the country and contribute to the increasing 
Arabization and Islamization of Indonesian society. As of 2018, over 400 schools have 
implemented the Beyond Bali Education Program. Given the success of the smaller Salafi 
school network, a program the size of Beyond Bali should have sufficient reach, at least, 
to be able to produce meaningful social change in a target community. 
The idea that influence does not require a large number of schools is significant 
because it means that Western governments do not necessarily need to establish a massive 
CVE education program to achieve broad effects. Considering this feature, a smaller CVE 
program can expend less logistical and financial resources and still meet the program 
objective. Initially restricting a program’s size also enables planners to focus on quality 
over quantity to better ensure the program will produce the desired effects. Finally, this 
point may even improve assessment by allowing evaluative efforts to focus on a smaller 
target population to validate results before expanding the program. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
Considering the power of socialization to form communal identities and commit 
members of a group to specific values, this thesis offers three broad recommendations for 
incorporating socialization into CVE education. First, CVE education practitioners should 
consider incorporating socialization theory into new plans and applying the theory to 
analyses of existing CVE education efforts. To accomplish this fully, planners should select 
and incorporate a specific set of communal values that shape social norms to support the 
desired end state of the program. Furthermore, CVE practitioners need to focus on shaping 
the content of a program to reinforce its socializing effect rather than simply teaching 
abstract knowledge and cognitive skills so that students gain not only the necessary 
knowledge but also the motivation and commitment to behave in a manner consistent with 
the goals of the program. 
Second, CVE planners and policymakers should consider the time, direction, and 
resources that CVE education programs need to achieve lasting results. This support should 
extend beyond providing funds to include teacher education and highly-curated content 
specifically designed to impart a set of communal values and behavioral expectations that 
support the objective of the program. Despite the political, logistical, and financial 
complications involved, planners and policymakers need to consider that CVE programs 
need to execute for decades, or even indefinitely. In addition to the consistency that a long 
timeline provides, CVE programs need this time to work because prevention requires 
persistence and the socialization process restarts with every new generation of students. 
While a CVE program that lasts only several years may achieve success with current 
students, future groups of students will not receive the necessary education to build and 
maintain communal resistance to violent extremism. 
Finally, it is important to note that schools are not the only socializing agents 
exerting influence over students. Families, social groups, religious institutions, and many 
other organizations all have a socializing effect in the environment. Shaping a CVE 
program to complement the socio-cultural dynamics, belief systems, social trends, and 
familial expectations of the target society will reinforce its socializing impact, avoid 
unnecessary conflicts with other socializing agents, and help secure the program’s position 
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as part of the community’s educational tradition. This social integration is particularly 
important if CVE programs hope to function effectively in the community over a 
significant period. 
Western governments will likely continue to invest considerable resources in CVE 
programs in their efforts to reduce the spread of terrorism both domestically and 
internationally. To assist in applying these resources with greater efficiency, this thesis 
investigated the potential of formal education as a long-term strategy for preventing violent 
extremism through socialization. The results of this study indicate a correlation between 
an educational program’s socialization activity and its ability to achieve its socio-political 
objectives, but further research is needed on how and why CVE education programs 
succeed or fail to confirm whether there is, in fact, a causal relationship between formal 
education, socialization, and violent extremism. Even so, socialization theory may serve as 
a powerful tool to assist planners in developing education programs to counter violent 
extremist ideologies. This theory may also potentially apply to a wide range of other socio-
political objectives, and assist in altering undesired social behaviors. 
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